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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of this thesis is to explore and analyze some of the major 
difficulties, challenges, and debates involved with the issue over which status and rights 
to afford to those detained in the War on Terrorism, in particular the Guantánamo 
detainees.  Unlike conflicts of the past, the War on Terrorism is being waged against very 
unconventional enemies.  Because of this, the Bush Administration, foreign governments, 
human rights groups, and both governmental and non-governmental organizations are 
currently engaged in a critical debate over which legal status and rights should be 
afforded to these enemies upon their detention. 
 If any agreement is to be made regarding the legal status of the Guantánamo 
detainees, it is important to obtain a basic understanding of the issue itself as well as both 
sides of the debate.  In order to do this, three core issues are explored.  Firstly, what are 
President Bushs strategic reasons for refusing to grant the Guantánamo detainees 
prisoner of war (POW) status and what are the steps that the Administration has taken to 
ensure that its strategies in approaching the War on Terror are protected?  Secondly, what 
are the counter arguments to the Bush Administrations position, who is voicing these 
arguments, and why?  Finally, what impact does the Administrations position have on 
how and to what extent the War on Terror is waged?  
 Once these questions have been explored, the thesis concludes that the Bush 
Administrations approach to the War on Terror has proven to be reckless.  The security 
threat posed by terrorism should not obscure the importance of human rights.  An anti-
terrorism policy that ignores human rights is a gift to terrorists.  It reaffirms the violent 
instrumentation that breeds terrorism as it undermines the public support needed to defeat 
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it.  A strong human rights policy that respects the detainees right to due process and to 
not be subjected to torture, cannot replace the actions of security forces, but is an 
essential complement.  A successful anti-terrorism policy must endeavor to build strong 
international norms and institutions based on human rights, not provide a new rationale 
for avoiding and undermining them.  If the Bush Administration remains on its present 
path, the rights of the Guantánamo detainees will continue to be violated and, as a result, 
threaten the rights of others who depend on the fair application of the law.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Introduction  
 Although terrorism is not a new phenomenon, the horrific events of September 
11, 2001, shocked the world as many watched coordinated al-Qaeda led terrorist attacks 
unfold on their television screens.  Of the four commercial airliners that were hijacked 
that day, three were successful in reaching their targets: the two towers of the World 
Trade Center in New York City, and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.  The casualties, 
economic damage, and public outrage that followed these attacks were unprecedented.  
Approximately 3,000 people from 78 countries died as a result of these tragic events, and 
the world community was forced to focus its attention on the wide-spread threat of 
international terrorism.  As a response to this threat, the United States declared a War on 
Terrorism.1  In a speech to Congress on September 20th, 2001, President George W. 
Bush proclaimed that this was a war [that] would not end until every terrorist group of 
global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.2 
On October 7, 2001, the War on Terrorism formally began when the United States 
and its allies launched a combined special forces and air assault against Afghanistan, the 
state that was giving al-Qaeda sanctuary.  The legal rationale for this attack was one of 
self-defense.  The US claimed that it was defending itself against reasonably anticipated 
future attacks by al-Qaeda resulting from the Taliban governments unwillingness to 
intervene to stop such activities from being planned and carried out from Afghanistan. 
                                                
1  According to the US Department of Defense, terrorism is defined as the calculated use of 
violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate 
governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or 
ideological.  For the purpose of this thesis, this is what is meant when referring to terrorism. 
2 David C. Rapoport, The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism, in Audrey Kurth Cronin and 
James M. Ludes, Eds. Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46. 
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The war in Afghanistan was over relatively quickly.  By December 7, the last al-
Qaeda/Taliban stronghold fell, and on December 22 an interim government was sworn in.  
In spite of its short duration, thousands of Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters were captured 
during the attacks.  Although the war in Afghanistan had ended, the War on Terror had 
just begun, and so in January 2002, the US military began transporting some of the 
prisoners captured in Afghanistan to Camp X-Ray at the US Naval Base in Guantánamo 
Bay, Cuba. 
Since their detention, the legal status of these prisoners has been subject to heavy 
international debate.  Many foreign governments and human rights organizations argue 
that these prisoners, or at least the captured Taliban fighters, should be afforded prisoner-
of-war (POW) status under the Geneva Conventions.3   The Bush Administration in the 
US, however, maintains that although the Taliban fighters are covered by the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, they are not to be treated as POWs because they allegedly fail to 
meet international standards as lawful combatants.   
The debate over the legal status and rights of the Guantánamo detainees 
eventually made its way to the Supreme Court.  Unfortunately, the Courts June 2006 
ruling regarding the illegality of military commissions has done little to lessen the 
intensity of the debate.  Following the Supreme Courts ruling, the Bush Administration 
introduced the 2006 Military Commissions Act (MCA).  The MCA essentially nullifies 
the Courts ruling and legalizes the Administrations actions in the War on Terror thus 
far.  Because of this, the debate over the treatment of these detainees has continued.  
                                                
3 The Geneva Conventions are a series of international agreements that created and developed 
international humanitarian law to protect wounded combatants and those who assist them, 
prisoners of warm and civilians during times of war and other conflicts.  Hilaire McCoubrey, 
International Humanitarian Law: The Regulation of Armed Conflicts, (Aldershot, Great Britain: 
The Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1990).    
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Before delving deeper into the arguments made by both sides of this debate, it is 
important to examine the Geneva Conventions, in particular the Third Geneva 
Convention, which is often referred to as the Prisoner of War Convention (GPW).  The 
Geneva Conventions are generally accepted as the basis of international law, and each 
side of this debate has rooted some of its arguments in the GPW.  This chapter will next 
indicate why the legal status and rights of the Guantánamo detainees have become an 
important subject of study and will identify the core questions that will be addressed in 
this thesis.  Finally, an outline of each chapters contents will be listed. 
1.2 - Context 
 Since their arrival at Guantánamo Bay, the legal status and treatment of those 
captured during the attacks on Afghanistan have continued to garnish international  
attention and have produced a heated debate.  On one side is the Bush Administration and 
its supporters who maintain that detainees in the War on Terrorism should not be 
afforded POW status and the rights that are associated with that status.  On the other side, 
many US and international experts argue that the United States is acting both illegally 
and immorally in refusing to afford POW status to some of these prisoners.4  
Oddly enough, both sides have relied heavily upon the Geneva Conventions  in 
particular on the Third Convention  to bolster their arguments.  In order to better 
understand the reasons for this, it is necessary to take a brief look at the creation and 
general provisions of the Prisoner of War Convention itself. 
                                                
4 Examples of such experts include: the UN Commission on Human Rights, the International 
Federation for Human Rights, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Great Britains 
Supreme Court of Judicature, the Supreme Court of Canada, the governments of Malaysia and 
Germany, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the American Civil Liberties Union, the 
U.S. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the U.S. Anti-Defamation League, the Association 
of the Bar of the City of New York, the Law Society of England and Wales, and the U.S. 
National Assembly of Criminal Defense Lawyers, to name a few. 
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I  The Creation of the Geneva Conventions  
The issue of how to treat and handle prisoners of war did not make an appearance 
in international law until the 1899 Hague Conventions which led to the creation of the 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land.  These Regulations, 
which were revised in 1907, devoted 17 articles to prisoners of war.5  The articles address 
important issues, such as whether prisoners of war are in the power of the enemy 
government, or of the soldiers who captured them.  However, they stated that the 
capturing government could hold prisoners in custody in order to stop them from taking 
up arms once again, but in doing so they had to treat them humanely, and provide them 
with the same care they provided their own troops.  In addition to this, the government 
could require the detainees to work; however, this work could in no way be connected 
with war operations.6   
During the First World War, the Hague Regulations governed the treatment of 
seven million prisoners of war.  Although they provided general guarantees, dealing with 
the issue of prisoners of war was nevertheless difficult.  With no legal basis, the Red 
Cross created a central agency for prisoners of war to ensure that these regulations were 
being carried out.  For example, the inspection of internment camps by neutral delegates 
helped to regulate the conduct of detaining powers. 
The experience of this war led to the Third Geneva Convention - otherwise 
known as the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, or the Prisoner 
                                                
5 These articles (4-20) make up the second chapter of the first section of the Regulations Concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, which was signed in Hague on October 18, 1907. 
6 Chapter II, Section I of the Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on the Land.  The Hague, 
18 October, 1907.  Available: 
<http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/1d1726425f6955aec125641
e0038bfd6>. Retrieved: May 10, 2006. 
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of War Convention - which was signed in Geneva, Switzerland on June 17, 1925, by 128 
nations.  It was officially adopted in 1929 as an extension to the rights guaranteed by the 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.  In 1949 the Prisoner of War Convention was 
revised and was adopted on August 12 by the Diplomatic Conference for the 
Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War.  On 
October 21, 1950, the Third Geneva Convention entered into force. 
Marjorie Cohn summarizes this convention well in her article Geneva 
Conventions when she states that: 
As amended in 1949, the Third Geneva Conventionsets forth 
criteria to determine who is a POW, a protected person under this 
convention.  Where a doubt arises about whether a person is a 
POW, a competent tribunal must decide his or her status; in the 
meantime, the person must be afforded the protections of this 
convention.  POWs are entitled at all times to humane treatment 
and respect for their personal dignity and honor.  Their lives and 
health must not be endangered.  They must be protected against 
violence or intimidation, insults, and public curiosity.  They must 
be maintained in conditions as favorable as those for the forces of 
the detaining power.  No physical or mental torture, nor any other 
form of coercion, may be inflicted on POWs to secure information 
from them.  POWs who refuse to answer questions may not be 
threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous 
treatment of any kind.  POWs are bound to give only their 
surnames, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, 
regimental, personal or serial number.7   
 
1.3  Objectives and Core Questions  
The objective of this study is to explore and analyze some of the major 
difficulties, challenges, and debates involved with the issue over which status and rights 
to afford to those detained in the War on Terrorism. Unlike many conflicts in the past, the 
War on Terrorism is being waged against very unconventional enemies.  Because of this, 
                                                
7 Marjorie Cohn, Geneva Conventions, "Geneva Conventions," Microsoft Encarta Online 
Encyclopedia, 2007.  Available at 
<http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_762529232_1/Geneva_Conventions.html>.  
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the Bush Administration, foreign governments, human rights groups, and both 
governmental and non-governmental organizations are currently engaged in a critical 
debate over which legal status and rights should be afforded to these enemies upon their 
detention.  As a paper presented to the American Society of Criminology in November of 
2005 noted: 
Dealing with combatants, of any type, is likely to be a difficult 
security challenge in any conflict situation, regardless of whether 
the combatants are organized or semi-organized (i.e. paramilitary, 
militia, mercenary, rebel, revolutionary, guerrilla, resistance 
fighter, freedom fighter, terrorist, or insurgent).  An even greater 
challenge exists, theoretically, ethically, and legitimately in sorting 
out legals from illegals among the many combatants one is 
likely to encounter in foreign lands  ranging from women to 
children, to disabled and deranged, to the variety of insurgents and 
sympathizers, to criminals and terrorists and their networks 
and subcultures.8 
 
 If any agreement is to be made regarding the legal status of the Guantánamo 
detainees, it is important to obtain a basic understanding of the issue itself as well as both 
sides of the debate.  In order to do this, three core issues must be explored.  Firstly, what 
are President Bushs strategic reasons for refusing to grant the Guantánamo detainees 
POW status  and what are the steps that the Administration has taken in order to ensure 
that its strategies in approaching the War on Terror are protected (i.e. the 2006 Military 
Commissions Act)?  By examining this issue I am hoping to tease out some of the 
fundamental changes that have taken place in the way that war is now being conducted. 
 Secondly, what are the counter arguments to the Bush Administrations position, 
who is voicing these arguments, and why?  The answer to this is important because it will 
                                                
8 Tom OConnor and Mark Stevens, The Handling of Illegal Enemy Combatants, November 
2005. [Paper presented to the American Society of Criminology Meeting in Toronto].  Available 
at: http://faculty.ncwc.edu/tconnor/430/430lect16.htm. 
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highlight the fact that the development of the protection of human rights is characterized 
by a continuous tension between state sovereignty and human dignity.  
 Finally, what impact does the Bush Administrations position have on how and to 
what extent the War on Terror is waged?  This is an extremely important question to 
explore because it will likely help to predict the way in which future wars are conducted.   
1.4  Approach and Reading Guide   
 This thesis will explore the new dimensions that the War on Terror has brought to 
bear upon international humanitarian law.  In particular, it will examine how the legal 
status and rights of the detainees have been affected since this war began.  In order to do 
this, the thesis is divided into 5 chapters.  The first chapter is intended to present the 
reader with a clear picture of what the thesis is about and why the issue of the treatment 
of terrorist detainees is important. 
 The second chapter will briefly look at the events which led up to the internment 
of terrorists and suspected terrorists at the Guantánamo Bay detention center.  It will 
provide the background information needed to obtain a comprehensive idea of how the 
debate arose over which status to afford to the detainees in the War on Terror.  It will 
explore the events that occurred between the 9/11 terrorist attacks and detainees being 
taken to Camp X-Ray  the prison camp in which a number of those captured during the 
attacks on Afghanistan in 2001 are currently being held. 
 Chapter three serves two major purposes.  The first is to highlight the key 
differences between an illegal enemy combatant and a prisoner of war.  The second 
purpose is to delve into the debate of whether or not these detainees should be treated as 
illegal enemy combatants or as POWs.  It will explore the Bush Administrations initial 
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standpoint on the treatment of detainees in the War on Terrorism, the criticisms of the 
Administrations actions, and the Administrations strategic reasoning for maintaining its 
position. 
 The objective of the fourth chapter is to underline the legal proceedings that 
resulted in the creation of the 2006 Military Commissions Act. The Bush 
Administrations position and the adoption of the 2006 Military Commissions Act has 
had an impact not only on the way that the war on terrorism is being conducted, but on 
how future conflicts may be conducted as well. 
Finally, the fifth chapter will sum up the major arguments and findings made 
throughout the thesis and discuss their potential implications for the conduct of future 
wars.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
WHAT HAPPENED? 
 
2.1  September 11, 2001 
 At 8:46 am on Tuesday, September 11, 2001, American Airlines Flight 11 
crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York.  Many who 
witnessed the crash were reportedly overcome with shock and bewilderment at how such 
a tragic accident could occur.  These emotions quickly turned to fear however, when, 17 
minutes later, United Airlines Flight 175 slammed into the South Tower of the World 
Trade Center. 
 It was only with the second plane crash that people began to realize that America 
was under attack.  As the American Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) scrambled to 
regain control of US airspace, millions of people across the world watched the World 
Trade Center attacks being replayed over and over on their television screens, and 
wondered if and where anymore possible attacks would be, and who was behind them. 
At 9:37 am the third attack was carried out when American Airlines Flight 77 
plowed into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.  Fortunately, the section that was hit 
consisted mainly of newly renovated, unoccupied offices.  However, as the bright flames 
and dark smoke enveloped the west side of Americas military nerve, any lingering 
doubts about the terrorist nature of the attacks disappeared. 
 The fourth and final hijacked airplane, United Airlines Flight 93, slammed into a 
field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania at 10:03 am. Upon further investigation, the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States discovered that some of the 
passengers aboard this flight had decided to revolt against the terrorists to try to regain 
control of the airplane.  The Commission believed that the passengers successfully 
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thwarted the terrorists attacks on their original target, which many speculated was the 
White House, Capitol Hill, or Camp David.9 
 Less than 24 hours after the attacks began, the National Security Council and a 
small group of President Bushs key advisors determined that al Qaedas leader, Osama 
bin Laden, was behind the days vicious attacks.  As a result of this, President Bush gave 
the Taliban regime of Afghanistan  the state that was believed to be harboring bin Laden 
 a list of ultimatums.  Bush ordered the Taliban to: 
Deliver to United States authorities all leaders of al Qaeda who 
hide in your land.  Release all foreign nationals, including 
American citizens, you have unjustly imprisoned.  Protect foreign 
journalists, diplomats, and aid workers in your country.  Close 
immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in 
Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every person in 
their support structure, to appropriate authorities.  Give the United 
States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure 
they are no longer operating.  These demands are not open to 
negotiations or discussion.  The Taliban must act, and act 
immediately.  They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share 
in their fate.10    
 
2.2  Attacks on Afghanistan 
 The Taliban regime balked at Bushs demands and responded with a call for a 
holy war if infidels invade an Islamic country.11  As a result of their unwillingness to 
comply, on October 7, 2001, the US  initially joined by Britain and later by others  
launched an attack against Afghanistan which they named Operation Enduring 
Freedom.  The initial objectives of this operation were to attack bin Ladens training 
                                                
9 Wilson, Marshall, Kevin Fagan, Stacy Finz and Nanette Asimov, "FBI searching the passenger list of 
doomed S.F.-bound jet for clues", The San Francisco Chronicle, September 12, 2001.  
10 Quote taken from George W. Bushs September 23, 2001, Presidential Address to a Joint Session of 
Congress.  For a full transcript of this Address see, George W. Bush, We Will Prevail, (New York: The 
Continuum Publishing Group Inc., 2003), 11-18. 
11 Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban, 
(New York: Da Capo Press, 2002), 294. 
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camps and facilities from the air, causing as many al Qaeda casualties as possible, and 
also to target the Taliban, with the presumed goal of destroying their morale and effecting 
their disintegration or submission. 
 Unfortunately, neither objective could be quickly realized.  By the time the US 
and its allies were prepared to launch a counter-attack against bin Laden, he and his 
followers had long since dispersed to prepared hideouts and to villages and residential 
areas where they could easily blend in with the local populace.  To rely solely on 
bombing was, as one distinguished academic remarked, like using a blow torch to 
eradicate cancer.12 
 The initial attacks on the Taliban were equally ineffective.  Like the members of 
al Qaeda, the Taliban was able to disperse to safe locations, except where they had to 
man a front line.  As a result, the air strikes were unable to cause the collapse of the 
Taliban as a fighting force and government.  In fact, as Martin Ewans points out in his 
book, Afghanistan: A Short History of its People and Politics, the air bombardment 
seemed to do little more than increase the suffering being endured by the Afghans, both 
directly and as a result of the disruption of food convoys from Pakistan.13  
 Because their initial methods for destroying al Qaeda and the Taliban were 
obviously not producing the results it had hoped for, the strategy of the Operation quickly 
changed.  At the beginning of November, the US and its allies discarded an inhibition 
over joining forces with the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan.14  Within a few days of 
                                                
12 Sir Michael Howard, speaking at a Guardian/Royal United Services Conference, October 30, 2001.  This 
was cited in Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History of its People and Politics, (New York: Harper 
Collins Publishers Inc., 2002), 289. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy: US and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21stCentury, Lanham, 
Md:  Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, p.132. 
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aligning themselves with the Northern Alliance, the members of Operation Enduring 
Freedom were able to obtain control over the northern towns of Taloqan, Kunduz and 
Herat, and by November 13, Taliban control over Kabul had collapsed. 
Although it was making rapid progress in the north, the US pondered the problem 
of forming a proxy Southern Alliance that could match the achievements of the 
Northern one.  The US did not have to worry about this problem for long, however, 
because on December 7, the Taliban abandoned Kandahar.  Two days later, the vestige of 
Taliban rule in Afghanistan collapsed when Taliban in the province of Zabul, on the 
Pakistani border, surrendered. 
 Despite the fall of the Taliban regime, there was still the problem of al Qaeda.  
Because of al Qaedas clandestine nature, its members were able to disappear amidst a 
confused situation beyond the ability of US air power to correct.  As a result, the ground 
troops of the US, its allies and the Northern Alliance, became the new driving force 
behind the attacks on Afghanistan.  Although many members of al Qaeda were captured 
by these troops, bin Laden continued to elude his enemies.  Even the American offer of a 
$25 million reward for his capture was ineffective. 
 While the US and its allies fought to root out the Taliban and al Qaeda, the United 
Nations began working on an agreement that would serve as the starting point for 
rebuilding Afghanistan.  Their efforts led to the creation of the Agreement on Provisional 
Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending Re-establishment of Permanent Institutions  or 
the Bonn Agreement  that was signed by representatives of the Afghan people on 
December 5, 2001.  The objectives of the agreement were to establish an Interim 
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Authority to run the country and provide the basis of an interim system of law and 
governance.15 
On December 22, 2001, the Interim Administration took office at a dignified 
ceremony in Kabul.  The position of Chairman went to the moderate Pashtun Hamid 
Karzai.  Unfortunately for Karzai, ruling Afghanistan has not proven to be easy.  
However, as William Maley states in his book, The Afghanistan Wars, the Bonn 
Agreement [which is] focused on state-building rather than a division of spoils, 
constitutes a promising start, indeed the best hope that Afghanistan has had for many a 
long year.16    
2.3  Captured Combatants 
 Even though the attacks on Afghanistan only lasted a couple of months, thousands 
of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters were captured  primarily by the Northern Alliance.  
The vast majority of the captured Taliban fighters were processed and released in 
Afghanistan.  However, approximately 1,000 of the al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners were 
turned over to American forces for further questioning.  Those turned over to the US 
military were deemed either too dangerous for release, or were suspected of committing 
war crimes.  
On January 11, 2002, the US military began transporting some of the prisoners 
captured in Afghanistan to Camp X-Ray at the United States Navel Base at Guantánamo 
Bay, Cuba.  The captives that were transferred there were considered by the American 
government to be, as President Bush put it, the worst of the worst, with the most 
                                                
15 For a more detailed breakdown of these objectives see, Robert Peritos, Where is the Lone Ranger When 
We Need Him?  Americas Search for a Postconflict Stability Force, (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Institution of Peace Press, 2004), 289-291.  
16 William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 275. 
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valuable information on terrorist operations.  As of March 14, 2008 approximately 280 
people were still being held at this detention center.17 
2.4  Camp X-Ray, Guantánamo Bay, Cuba 
 The US Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba (sometimes abbreviated as GTMO 
or Gitmo) covers 116 square kilometers.  It was first established in 1898 during the 
Spanish-American War when the US helped Cuban rebels regain control of Cuba from 
Spanish rule.  In 1902 Cuba became an independent republic, and in 1903 the US 
negotiated a permanent lease for Gitmo with Cuba.  This agreement was strengthened 
with the Treaty of 1934.  The Treaty stipulated that the US would pay the Cuban 
government each year to lease the land; however, Cuba would continue to retain 
sovereignty over it.  In addition, the Treaty can not be broken unless both parties agree to 
terminate it.18 
Gitmo has served several purposes since its establishment: it functions as a 
refueling and maintenance port for US ships; it polices illegal drug trafficking into the 
US; and it has acted as a temporary refugee camp for Cuban and Haitian migrants.  
Despite its many purposes, Gitmo has become famous  or infamous rather  for the role 
it now plays in the detention of those captured in the war on terror that are considered to 
be the most dangerous and/or with the most valuable information on terrorist 
operations.19 
                                                
17 US Department of Defense (News Release),  Defense Department Takes Custody Of A High-Value 
Detainee,  March 14, 2008.  Available: < 
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11758>. 
18 US Naval Station, Guantánamo Bay, History of Guantánamo Bay.  Available On-Line at: 
<http://www.cnic.navy.mil/Guantanamo/AboutGTMO/gtmohistgeneral/gtmohistgeneral>. 
19 Bill Scheppler, Guantánamo Bay and Military Tribunals: The Detention and Trial of Suspected 
Terrorists, (New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, Inc., 2005), 4-10. 
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When the first captives in the war on terror reached Guantánamo Bay, they were 
sent to Camp X-Ray.  However, Camp X-Ray drew criticisms almost immediately.  Its 
outdoor cells, which measured 6 feet by 8 feet with chain-link walls and wooden roofs, 
were called scandalous cages, offering little protection from the elements.20  Because of 
the harsh criticism, construction on a new detention center began in late February, 2002  
this new facility is called Camp Delta.  On April 29, 2002, Camp X-Ray was permanently 
closed, and all prisoners were transferred to Camp Delta.  However, it is important to 
note that the term Camp X-Ray has come to be used as a synonym for all Guantanamo 
facilities (i.e. Camp Delta, Camp Echo & Camp Iguana) where prisoners from the US 
invasion of Afghanistan are detained. 
2.5  The Controversial Treatment of Camp X-Rays Detainees 
 Shortly after the suspected terrorists began to arrive at Camp X-Ray, stories of 
abuse and unlawful treatment by their American captors began to surface.  The US was 
accused by a number of groups and agencies such as the Red Cross, Amnesty 
International, and even the FBI, of using excessive force that bordered on torture, 
including sleep deprivation, extended periods of isolation, lengthy interrogation, exposure 
to extreme temperatures, and threats using dogs.21  As Airat Vakhitor, a Russian Muslim, 
described shortly upon his release from Gitmo in March 2004: 
                                                
20 Matthew Monteverde, Americas Presence in Iraq: Winning the Peace, (New York, The Rosen 
Publishing Group, Inc., 2004), 11.  
21 Neil Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantánamo,  The New York Times.  November 30, 
2004.  Available: <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/30/politics/30gitmo.html>.   
    Amnesty International, End Human Rights Scandal in Guantánamo and Other Places, Amnesty 
International Press Release, April 11, 2004.  Available: 
<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGPOL300172004?open&of=ENG-USA>. 
     Dan Eggen & Jeffrey Smith, FBI Agents Allege Abuse of Detainees at Guantánamo Bay, The 
Washington Post, December 20, 2004: p. A01.  Available: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A14936-2004Dec20.html>. 
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They would place a person in an investigative room and keep him 
there for several days handcuffed to the floor and prevent him from 
falling asleep by playing loud music, shining bright lights and so 
on.  There was a program where we would be moved from one cell 
to another every 15 minutes continually over a period of three or 
four months.22 
 
In addition to the stories of alleged torture, critics of the Bush Administrations 
position on the Guantánamo detainees claim that the use of such methods violates 
international law.  Moreover, it is alleged arbitrary detention and suppression of habeas 
corpus are also offenses.23  
 As more people become aware of Camp X-Ray and the events that were  and 
still are  allegedly taking place there, the debate over the treatment and legal status of 
Guantánamo detainees has elicited increased international criticism.  However, the US 
and its allies are engaged in a new type of war against an unconventional enemy.  If the 
US is required to adhere to existing rules of war that were designed with state versus state 
warfare in mind, would this permit the successful prosecution of a war against terrorists 
who do not follow the rules of war?  On the other hand, if it does disregard the laws of 
war, is it essentially erasing centuries of progress in international law and the defense of 
universal human rights?  The appropriate balance between rights and security is 
something that both the US and the international community need to figure out soon 
because the legal status and rights afforded to the detainees in the war on terrorism will 
                                                
22 Vladmir Isachenkov, Former Inmate Tells of Quran Abuse, The Moscow Times, Wednesday, July 29, 
2005; p.3. 
23 Some of these critics include: the UN Commission on Human Rights, the International Federation for 
Human Rights, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Great Britains Supreme Court of Judicature, 
the Supreme Court of Canada, the governments of Malaysia and Germany, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International, the American Civil Liberties Union, the U.S. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the U.S. 
Anti-Defamation League, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the Law Society of England 
and Wales, and the U.S. National Assembly of Criminal Defense Lawyers, to name a few. 
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not only affect the way in which the current war is waged, but it may also have an impact 
on future wars.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE DEBATE: ILLEGAL ENEMY COMBATANT OR POW? 
 
 Within the Pentagon, it was recognized as early as September 2001 that, in the 
planned military action, issues relating to the treatment and legal status of detainees 
would emerge.  In an attempt to minimize some of the possible confusion, the United 
States Air Forces International and Operations Law Division circulated an unpublished 
document that contained the main outlines of an approach which continues to be 
influential today.  As Adam Roberts points out in his article, The Laws of War, this 
document clearly states that 
Terrorists were to be treated as unlawful combatants; it was 
very unlikely that a captured terrorist would be legally entitled to 
POW status under the Geneva Conventions; however, there was a 
particular US interest in application of Law of Armed Conflict 
principles in the context of reciprocity of treatment of captured 
personnel.  With regard to treatment upon capture, if a terrorist is 
captured, Department of Defense members must at the very least 
comply with the principles of the spirit of the Law of Armed 
ConflictA suspected terrorist captured by US military personnel 
will be given the protections of but not the status of POW.24   
 
 Although over five years have passed since this document was first circulated, the 
Bush Administration continues to maintain this position.  Before examining the 
Administrations strategic reasons for this, it is necessary to take a brief look at the major 
differences between an illegal enemy combatant and a POW. 
3.1  Key Differences Between a POW and an Illegal Enemy Combatant 
 As the Guantánamo example clearly illustrates, not all persons captured in the 
course of armed conflict are automatically entitled to POW status and the legal 
protections and rights associated with that status.  In order to be protected as a POW, 
                                                
24 Adam Roberts, The Laws of War, in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, Eds. Attacking  
Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 202. 
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international law provides that the captured combatant should fulfill the following four 
conditions: 
(1) Be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(2) Have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(3) Carry arms openly, and; 
(4) Conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.25 
 
Unless it is determined that a captured combatant does not fulfill the above 
requirements, then according to international law, the detaining power has the 
responsibility to ensure that the rights and protections that accompany POW status are 
met.  For example, a few of these rights and protections include: 
• If questioned, POWs are only obliged to give their name and rank, date of birth, 
and army serial number (or equivalent information).  In addition, no torture or 
other form of coercion may be inflicted upon them in order to obtain any type of 
information. 
 
• POWs cannot be punished for acts they have not committed or subjected to 
collective punishment. 
 
• POWs have the right to practice their religion, send and receive letters, receive a 
copy of the Geneva Conventions, and appoint a representative among 
themselves to deal with the detaining authorities. 
 
• POWs must be interned in premises which afford guarantees of hygiene.  The 
detaining power has an obligation to provide food, clothing, shelter, and if 
necessary, the same medical care that is given to members of its own forces. 
 
• Except with their consent, POWs are not to be separated from other prisoners of 
the same forces with which they were serving.26 
 
Illegal enemy combatants, on the other hand, are provided very little rights and 
protections under international law.  The term illegal enemy combatant is currently 
used by those who view the War on Terror as an armed conflict in the legal sense  to 
refer to persons believed to belong to, or believed to be associated with terrorist groups  
                                                
25 Third Geneva Convention  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 
12, 1949, Article 4 (A). 
26 Third Geneva Convention, Articles 17, 20, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33 & 71.  
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regardless of the circumstances of their capture.  As an official statement made of July 
21, 2005 by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) maintains, unlike 
POWs, illegal enemy combatants 
may be prosecuted under domestic law for directly participating 
in hostilities.  They may be interned for as long as they pose a 
serious security threat, and, while in detention, may under specific 
conditions be denied certain privileges under the Fourth Geneva 
Convention.27  They may also be prosecuted for war crimes and 
other crimes and sentenced to terms exceeding the length of 
conflict, including the range of penalties provided for under 
domestic law.28 
 
 Fortunately, a procedure for determining who is entitled to POW status is 
addressed directly in two treaties.  The first of these  the Prisoner of War Convention  
provides in Article 5 that, in cases of doubt, prisoners shall be treated as POWs until 
such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.  The second 
treaty is the 1977 Geneva Protocol 1.  In this, Article 45 suggests that a detainee has the 
right to assert his entitlement to prisoner of war status before a judicial tribunal.  In other 
words, international law provides that detainees are to be granted POW status and the 
rights and privileges afforded to that status until a competent, judicial tribunal deems 
otherwise. 
3.2  The Taliban & al Qaeda: POWs or Illegal Enemy Combatants? 
The 2001 war in Afghanistan  waged by the United States and several allied 
countries against the Taliban regime and the al Qaeda terrorist network  raised a couple 
of issues pertinent to the issue of lawful/unlawful combatancy. 
                                                
27 The Fourth Geneva Convention is the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War (The Civilian Convention).  Basically anyone who does not meet the requirements to fall under the 
first three conventions  The Wounded Convention, The Maritime Convention, or The Prisoner of 
War Convention  would fall under this category. 
28 International Committee of the Red Cross, The Relevance of IHL in the Context of Terrorism, July 21, 
2005.  Available: 
<http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList488/8C4F31C025CDDC1257045002CD4A2>. 
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The first, and perhaps most obvious problem relates to the status of the captured 
Taliban fighters.  As Yoram Dinstein notes in his book, The Conduct of Hostilities Under 
the Law of International Armed Conflict, on one hand, the Taliban regime  on the eve 
of the war  was in de facto control of as much as 90 per cent of the territory of 
Afghanistan.  On the other hand, the regime was unrecognized by the overwhelming 
majority of the international community.29   However, even though the Taliban regime 
was not officially recognized as Afghanistans government by the majority of the 
international community, this lack of recognition cannot erode the privileges of 
combatants under customary international law.  In fact, Article 4 (A) (3) clearly states 
that POW status is meant to include members of regular armed forces who profess 
allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the detaining power.  In 
light of this, the only way that members of the Taliban regime could be denied POW 
status is if they failed to fulfill the four conditions of lawful combatancy which were 
listed in section 3.1.30  
 The second issue that emerged during the war in Afghanistan in regard to 
lawful/unlawful combatancy concerns the al Qaeda fighters.  Although the United States 
and its allies focused their attacks on Afghani soil, the attacks were primarily aimed at 
eradicating the al Qaeda terrorist network rather than replacing the Taliban regime.  
Unlike the Taliban, al Qaeda openly and brazenly disregarded one of the conditions that 
would have guaranteed them POW status is caught later on  they failed to conduct their 
                                                
29 Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict. (Cambridge: 
The Cambridge University Press, 2004), 47. 
30 The four conditions of lawful combatancy are: 1) being commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates; 2) having a fixed distinctive sigh recognizable at a distance; 3) carrying arms openly, and; 4) 
conducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.  
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operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.31  As Yoram Dinstein 
writes,  
Al Qaedas contempt for this quintessential prerequisite 
qualification of lawful combatancy was flaunted in the execution 
of the original armed attack of 9/11.  Not only did the al Qaeda 
terrorists, wearing civilian clothes, hijack US civilian passenger 
airliners.  The most striking aspect of the shocking 9/11 events are 
that: (a) the primary objective target [the World Trade Center] was 
unmistakably a civilian objective: close to 3,000 innocent civilians 
lost their lives in the ensuing carnage; (b) [the targets] were 
struck by hijacked passenger airlines, which were used as flying 
bombs, in total oblivion to the fate of hundreds of civilian 
passengers in board.  No group conducting attacks in such an 
egregious fashion can claim for its fighters prisoner of war status.32 
 
3.3  The Bush Administrations Position  
 Although the Bush Administration initially resisted distinguishing between the 
Taliban and al Qaeda captives, it eventually conceded that the Taliban detainees do 
qualify under the Geneva Conventions since they were essentially representatives of the 
Afghan government, and an international conflict had in fact arisen between two 
sovereign nation-states  the US and Afghanistan.33  However, the Administration 
continues to refuse to grant full POW status to the Taliban because they claim that the 
Taliban do not meet all of the required conditions listed under Article 4 of the Geneva 
Conventions, such as wearing uniforms or a fixed distinctive sign that was recognizable 
at a distance.34   
                                                
31 Third Geneva Convention, Article 4 (A) (4). 
32 Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict, 49. 
33 OConnor & Stevens, The Handling of Illegal Enemy Combatants. 
34 Alberto Gonzales,  Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the 
Conflict With al Qaeda and the Taliban, January 25, 2002, in Mark Danner, Torture and Truth: America, 
Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror,  (New York: New York Review Books, 2004), 83-87. 
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 In a February 7, 2002 memorandum from the White House to a number of senior 
Washington officials, some key reasons are outlined as the basis for refusing to grant the 
al Qaeda captives POW status.  The memorandum asserts that al Qaeda is clearly not a 
party to the Geneva treaty (but rather a terrorist network), and further, its operatives are 
not regular armed forces fighting on behalf of a state, as the GPW specifies.  In effect, 
al Qaeda is a stateless organization, beyond what the Geneva Conventions envisioned, 
and it acts with reckless disregard to any recognized rules of engagement.  This being 
true, the Administration has some solid grounds for refusing to grant the al Qaeda 
detainees POW privileges.35 
3.4  The Counter-Arguments: Who is Opposing the Bush Administrations Position     
         and Why? 
 
 Since the detainees began to arrive at Camp X-Ray, there has been a flood of 
criticism from a variety of groups and individuals who disagree with how the Bush 
Administration has chosen to handle these captives.  Some of the most notable of these 
critics are the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (replaced by the United 
Nations Human Rights Council in April 2006), the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Federation for Human Rights, 
Great Britains Supreme Court of Judicature, the Supreme Court of Canada, the 
American Civil Liberties Union, the United States Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights, the United States Defamation League, the Associate Bar of the City of New York, 
the Law Society of England and Wales, and the United States National Assembly of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, to name a few.    The Administrations refusal to grant POW 
                                                
35 The White House, Memorandum on the Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, 
February 7, 2002, in Mark Danner, Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror (New 
York: New York Review Books, 2004), 105-106. 
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status to any of the Guantánamo detainees has been denounced for a number of reasons 
which can be placed into three categories: (I) Prior US Practice; (II) Present Impact, and 
(III) Future Consequences. 
I  Prior US Practice  
 Some of the opposition to the Bush Administrations position regarding the 
Guantánamo detainees comes from the fact that since the Geneva Conventions were 
concluded in 1949, the United States has never denied their applicability to either US or 
opposing forces engaged in armed conflict, in spite of several opportunities to do so.  
During the Vietnam conflict, US forces classified Viet Congs main force and local force 
personnel, as well as certain Viet Cong irregulars, as POWs.36 This choice was made 
despite the existence of doubts and ambiguities over whether or not these forces met all 
four criteria of Article 4 of the Prisoner of War Convention.  Any Viet Cong irregulars 
who were captured were to be classified as POWs so long as they were captured while 
engaging in combat or a belligerent act under arms.  In fact, in one of the key directives 
issued by the US Military Assistance Command of Vietnam, it is clearly outlined under 
the Responsibilities section that: 
All United States Military and DOD civilian personnel who take or have 
custody of a detainee will: 
(1)  Comply with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.   
       Violation of the human provisions of the Conventions is an  
       offence under the Uniform Code if Military Justice.  Persons  
       who commit violations of the Geneva Conventions may be  
       subjected to a trial by court-martial. 
                                                
36 According to Annex A, Criteria for Classification and Disposition of Detainees, part of Directive 381-
46 (December 27, 1967), these classifications are defined as the following: Main Force  Those Viet Cong 
military units which are directly subordinate to the central office for South Vietnam, a Front, Viet Cong 
military region, or sub-region; Local Force  The Viet Cong military units within a specific Viet Cong 
province or district; Irregulars  Organized forces composed of guerrilla, self-defense, and secret self-
defense elements subordinate to village and hamlet level Viet Cong organizations.  These forces perform a 
wide variety of missions in support of Viet Cong activities, and provide a training and mobilization base for 
maneuver and combat support forces. 
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(2)  Afford to each detainee in their custody treatment consistent  
      with that of a prisoner of war, unless it has been determined by  
      competent authority [i.e. military tribunal] in accordance with  
      this directive that the detainee is not a prisoner of war.37 
 
In other words, even though the majority of the captured Viet Cong irregulars 
were not wearing a distinctive emblem or uniform, according to the directives handed out 
by the US Military Assistance Command, they were still to be treated as POWs  at least 
until a competent tribunal would determine otherwise.  Like the detainees in Vietnam, 
many of those captured in the attacks on Afghanistan in 2001 were not wearing uniforms.  
However, to the chagrin of many observers, those captured in Afghanistan were not 
afforded the same rights as their Viet Cong counterparts.  
II  Present Impact 
The Bush Administrations position on the Guantánamo detainees has had a 
significant impact on the way in which the War on Terror is currently being conducted.  
Their position on this issue has not only reshaped the way in which war is waged, but it 
has also challenged the previously accepted laws of armed conflict.  Because of this, the 
Administration has had to endure criticism in a number of areas, including: the detainees 
living conditions, the US interrogation tactics, and the justice system being used to 
determine the prisoners guilt or innocence.  In addition to this, critics also argue that the 
Bush Administration is putting its own troops in danger, tarnishing Americas image, and 
affecting the relationship that the US has with other members of the international 
community. 
 
 
                                                
37 Annex A, Inspections & Investigations: Prisoners of War  Determination of Eligibility, Directive 
Number 20-5 (March 15, 1968), Articles 6 (a)(1) & 6 (a)(2) 
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i  Human Rights 
 Much of the opposition to the Administrations stance on the Guantánamo 
detainees has been in regard to the lack of human rights protections that these captives 
have received.  Groups such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, Human 
Rights Watch, and Amnesty International immediately stepped up in order to ensure that 
these detainees basic human rights were being met.  As Professor Michael Byers wrote 
in an article entitled, Prisoners on Our Conscience, even if the detainees are not 
POWs, they remain human beings with human rights.38  The Bush Administration has 
been criticized for failing to uphold the basic human rights of the captives in the 
following three areas: a) the living conditions provided at Guantánamo Bay; b) the 
interrogation methods used on the prisoners, and finally; d) the trial and punishment of 
these captives. 
a) Living Conditions 
 The first of the detainees to arrive at Guantánamo Bay were greeted with the 
makeshift Camp X-Ray  consisting of small cages with chain link sides, concrete floors 
and metal roofs, offering scant shelter from the elements, and with very basic sanitary 
facilities.  Asif Iqbal, a British detainee who was interviewed by Human Rights Watch, 
described his introduction to life in Camp X-Ray as the following: 
In my cage there were two towels, one blanket, one small 
toothbrush, soap, flip flops, and an insulation mat to sleep on as 
well as two buckets, one with water and one to use as a toilet.  
[The restrictions on the detainees initially] were probably the worst 
things that we had to endure In the first few weeks, we were not 
allowed to exercise at all; this meant that all day every day we 
were stuck in a cage of two meters by two meters.  We were 
allowed out for two minutes a week to have a shower and then 
                                                
38 Michael Byers, Prisoner on Our Conscience, The Guardian Weekly, January 17, 2002.  Also available 
on-line: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/GWeekly/Story/0,3939,634376,00.html>. 
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returned to the cage During the day we were forced to sit in the 
cell (we couldnt lie down) in total silence.  We couldnt lean on 
the wire fence or stand up and walk around the cage.39   
 
 Because of prisoner accounts such as this one, and with the pressure put on the 
Administration by human rights organizations, construction of a permanent detention 
center began in late February, 2002.  Camp Delta is the result of the Administrations 
efforts to improve the living conditions of the Guantánamo detainees.  The new 7-by-8 
foot cells now include such accommodations as sinks with running water, flush toilets, 
and beds with mattresses, sheets, and blankets.  In addition, the steel frame construction 
and sealed roofs offer far greater shelter from the wind, rain and sun.  
 Although the Administrations critics consider this an improvement, they argue 
that there is still much to be done regarding the inmates living conditions.  Some of the 
procedures that are applied to the prisoners by their US captives have caused both 
international and domestic outrage.  For example, critics, such as the European 
Parliament, argue that the common practice of hooding the detainees, even temporarily, 
constitutes a violation of the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Cruel, Inhumane, or 
Degrading Treatment.40  In addition to causing unnecessary mental anguish, this practice 
prevents the detainees from identifying anyone who causes them harm.  The Center for 
Constitutional Rights also argues that forcefully shaving off the detainees beards 
constitutes a violation of the right to human dignity under the 1966 International 
                                                
39 Statements of Shafiq Rascul, Asif Iqbel and Rhuhel Ahmed, Detention in Afghanistan and Guantánamo 
Bay, released publicly on August 4, 2004 (para. 63, 65).  Available on-line: 
<http://www.ccr.ny.org/V2/reports/docs/Gitmo-compositestatementFINAL23july04.pdf>. 
40 European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution on the Situation of Detainees in Guantánamo, 
European Parliament [On-line], May 23, 2006.  Available: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B6-2006-0300&language=EN>. 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.41  Much of the opposition to the Administrations 
position argues that in order for the living conditions to improve, it is necessary for 
practices such as these to stop.  As Michael Byers noted,  
Although strict security arrangements are important in dealing with potentially 
dangerous individuals, none of these measures is necessary to achieving that 
goal.  If human rights are worth anything, they have to apply when 
governments are most tempted to violate them.42   
          
 
b) Interrogation & Torture 
 A second highly controversial issue regarding the human rights of the detainees 
has to do with some of the US methods of interrogation.  One argument cited frequently 
in the press for denying POW status to the detainees is that the US military would no 
longer be able to interrogate them in an effort to gain the desired intelligence concerning 
terrorist planned operations.  As mentioned before, Article 17 of the Prisoners of War 
Convention requires prisoners to give only a few personal facts, including name, rank, 
and serial number.  However, although most armies undoubtedly forbid their soldiers 
from divulging any more information than what is required, there is no actual prohibition 
against the detaining power from asking for more information. 
 Even though the Prisoner of War Convention clearly states that it is forbidden to 
use mental or physical coercion to extract information from prisoners, tactics such as 
trickery or promises of improved living conditions are not prohibited.43  However, this 
same Article then goes on to provide that prisoners of war who refuse to answer may 
                                                
41 Denbeaux, Mark & Joshua W. Denbeaux, Report on Guantánamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees 
Through Analysis of Department of Defense Data, The Center For Constitutional Rights (February 2006).  
Seton Jall Public Research Paper No. 46.  Available: < 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/CCR_FIDH.pdf>. 
42 Byers, Prisoners on Our Conscience, para. 10.  
43 Third Geneva Convention, Article 17. 
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not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of  
any kind.44  Torture is never permitted in questioning a detainee, regardless of that 
persons status. 
 Unfortunately, there have been many reports that claim that US officials are using 
various forms of torture as an interrogation tactic in the Guantánamo Bay facility.  Dan 
Eggen, a writer for the Washington Post, recently wrote a piece on some of the 
questionable interrogation tactics being used on the detainees at Guantánamo Bay: 
[In a 2004 internal survey] FBI employees said that they had 
witnessed 26 incidents of possible mistreatmentincluding 
previously reported cases in which prisoners were shackled to the 
floor for extended periods of time or subjected to sexually 
suggestive tactics by female interrogators. 
 
In [another] allegation, one interrogator bragged to an FBI agent 
that he forced a prisoner to listen to Satanic black metal music for 
hours, then dressed up as a Catholic priest before baptizing him. 
 
One agent reported being told that while questioning the male 
captives, female interrogators would sometimes wet their hands 
and touch detainees faces in order to interrupt their prayers.  Such 
actions would make some Muslims consider themselves unclean 
and unable to continue praying. 
 
[Other] reported tacticsinclude wrapping a prisoner in an Israeli 
flag, subjecting others to extreme heat and cold, and aggressively 
using strobe lights on others. 
 
[The final tactic mentioned in Eggens piece is described as] the 
frequent flyer program, in which detainees who were deemed 
uncooperative were placed on a list to be subjected to special sleep 
deprivation tactics.  [For example], the prisoners were moved 
frequently from cellblock to cellblock at intervals of two to four 
hours to interrupt their sleep45 
 
                                                
44 Ibid. 
45 Dan Eggen, FBI Reports Duct-Taping, Baptizing at Guantánamo, The Washington Post, January 3, 
2007, p. A01, para. 7, 8, 9, 16, 18. 
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 Another highly controversial interrogation tactic that US officials recently 
admitted to have used on the Guantánamo detainees is waterboarding.  In February 2008, 
the director of the CIA, Michael Hayden, publicly acknowledged that some of the 
Guantánamo detainees had been waterboarded  that is, subjected to simulated 
drowning.46 
In spite of the fact that not all of the interrogation tactics listed above cause 
extreme pain, critics of these methods label them as torturous because of the 
psychological anguish that they cause.  The American Civil Liberties Union is a staunch 
supporter of the detainees rights in this regard, and has launched a law suit against the 
Bush Administration for allowing such practices to take place.47 
c) Trial & Punishment 
Another major criticism regarding the treatment of Guantánamo detainees is 
grounded in the uncertainty regarding whether and when they will be tried and whether 
they will be held indefinitely or released.  Shortly after the first prisoners began to arrive 
at Guantánamo Bay, the US indicated that the judicial process might have to wait until 
after the war on terrorism is won, at which distant point the detainees might be tried or 
released.48  Critics argue that the Administrations ability to hold these captives 
indefinitely, without charge or trial, violates fundamental standards of human rights. 
 
 
                                                
46 Ed Pilkington, US Issues 9/11-Related Charges Against Six Guantanamo Detainees, The Guardian.  
Available: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/11/guantanamo/print>. 
47 American Civil Liberties Union, On-Line. The Case Against Rumsfeld. Available at: 
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/detention.html 
48 Ambassador Prosper speaking in London, September 20, 2002.  Owen Boycott,  Guantánamo Britains 
Still a Threat, Says US, The Guardian(London), September 21, 2002, 23. 
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ii  Endangering US Soldiers 
 Another criticism of the Bush Administrations position regarding the 
Guantánamo detainees has been voiced within the Administration itself.  Some are 
concerned that, by refusing to grant those captured in the attacks on Afghanistan POW 
status, the Administration is unintentionally putting its own soldiers at a greater risk.  If 
captured, US troops may not be able to claim POW status, given that they do not 
recognize that status for many of combatants that they capture.  As Colin Powell pointed 
out to both the Counsel to the President and the Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs in a January 26, 2002 memo, [failing to apply the Geneva  
Conventions could]undermine the protections of the laws of war for our troops, both in 
this specific conflict and in general. 49 
iii  Tarnishing Americas Image 
 Many critics also claim that the Bush Administrations position on the 
Guantánamo detainees is harming Americas image.  As Patrick Quinn, Lieutenant 
Governor of Illinois, writes,  
dozens of ex-detainees, government ministers, lawmakers, human 
rights activists, lawyers and scholars in Iraq, Afghanistan and the 
United States concur that the detention system often is unjust and 
hurts the war on terror by inflaming anti-Americanism in Iraq and 
elsewhere.50   
 
 Because of this perceived increase in anti-Americanism, prior to resigning, 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, began to question whether the Administrations 
                                                
49 Colin Powell, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of the Geneva 
Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan.  January 26, 2002, in Mark Danner, Torture and Truth: 
America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror (New York: New York Review Books, 2004, 89. 
50 Patrick Quinn, US War Prisons Legal Vacuum for 14,000, Yahoo News [On-line], September 17, 2006.  
Available: <http://news.yahoo.com/slap/20060917/ap_on_re_mi_ea/in_american_hands_3&printer=1>. 
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actions were actually succeeding in eliminating more enemies than it was creating.51  
Unfortunately, any reasonable doubt that anyone may have had on that score was  
eliminated by the April 2006 National Intelligence Estimate.52  As Senator Patrick Leahy 
noted: 
Our intelligence agencies agreed and confirm what many of us 
have been saying and what the American people know intuitively: 
The global jihadist movement is spreading and adapting, it is 
increasing in both number and geographic dispersion.  If this 
trend continues, that is, if we do not wise up and change course 
and adopt a new winning strategy, threats to US interests at home 
and abroad will become more diverse, leading to increasing 
worldwide attacks.  Attacks have been increasing worldwide over 
the last five years of these failing policies and we are, according to 
the judgment of our own, newly reconstituted intelligence 
agencies, likely to increase further in the days and months and 
years ahead.  [The National Intelligence Estimate] goes on to note 
ominously that new jihadist networks and cells, with anti-
American agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge.  And 
further, that the operational threat will grow particularly abroad, 
but also in the Homeland.  This is chilling.  The Bush-Cheney 
Administration has not only failed for five years to bring Osama 
bin Laden to justice, having yanked our special forces that had him 
on the run in Tora Bora and diverting them to Iraq, [but] has 
witnessed the spread of additional enemies with anti-American 
agendas.53   
 
 In addition to this, critics, such as Jon Hillson Inglewood of the L.A. Times, claim 
that the Administrations position does nothing more than place its arrogant nature on 
display for all to see.54  If the Bush Administration had followed the procedures 
                                                
51 Donald Rumsfeld, Memorandum on the Global War on Terrorism, USA Today On-Line, October 16, 
2003.  Available: < http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm>. 
52 The National Intelligence Estimate was conducted by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) who 
serves as the head of the Intelligence Community. The DNI also acts as the principal advisor to the 
President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters 
related to the national security; and oversees and directs the implementation of the National Intelligence 
Program. A breakdown of this report is available on-line at: 
<http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf>. 
53 Leahy, Statement on the Military Commissions Act, September 28, 2006, para. 6. 
54 Jon Hillson Inglewood, Guantánamo Base Shows U.S. Arrogance, The Los Angeles Times.  January 3, 
2002, B12. 
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prescribed by the Geneva Conventions to begin with, and had allowed the Guantánamo 
detainees status to be determined by a competent tribunal, then it would have quickly 
realized that most of these captives would have likely failed to meet the conditions 
needed to obtain POW status anyway.  Michael Byers also maintains that had the Bush 
Administration followed the Conventions procedures, it would have gained a lot more 
respect from the international community, and its operational structure would still likely 
be quite similar to what it is today.55 
iv  Relationship With the International Community 
Shortly after the first captives began to arrive at the Guantánamo Bay prison 
facilities, Colin Powell warned the Administration that its position on the legal status of 
these detainees will undermine critical support among critical allies, making military 
cooperation more difficult to sustain.56  Perhaps the Administration would have been 
better off had it taken Powells forewarning into more serious consideration.  Although 
the US strategy for winning the War on Terror is predicated on creating an international 
environment inhospitable to terrorists and all who support them, democratically elected 
leaders must also be responsive to their constituents.  Unfortunately, the treatment of the 
Guantánamo detainees has fostered animosity towards the US, thereby undermining its 
efforts to gain international support.  As Gerald Fogarty points out in his article, 
Guantánamo Bay: Undermining the Global War on Terror, 
Even governments stalwartly behind the war are under siege from 
their populations.  In Australia and the United Kingdom, for 
example, the governments are under increasing pressure to 
withdraw from the coalition because of public belief that 
                                                
55 Michael Byers, Discussion on Canadas Involvement in Afghanistan.  Political Studies 990 Seminar.  
The University of Saskatchewan.  Saskatoon.  January 25, 2007.  
56 Powell, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of the Geneva Conventions 
to the Conflict in Afghanistan, 89. 
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Americas treatment of Australian and British detainees violates 
the principles that the coalition of the willing aims to uphold.57 
 
In addition to this, as Powell also noted, Europeans and others will likely have legal 
problems with extradition or other forms of cooperation in law enforcement, including in 
bringing terrorists to justice.58 
 The Administrations actions in the War on Terror may also provoke other 
countries to investigate and possibly to prosecute US officials and troops for war crimes.  
Take Italy, for example.  Italy is currently conducting investigations into US actions in 
regard to the kidnapping of suspected terrorist, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr.  The Italian 
secret police were aggressively pursuing a criminal terrorism case against Nasr, an 
Egyptian cleric, with the help of American intelligence officials, when Nasr suddenly 
disappeared.  When Italian police began investigating, they were startled to find evidence 
that some of the CIA officers who had helped them investigate Nasr were involved in his 
abduction.   Italy has since charged 13 people identified as CIA officers  
and operatives of illegally abducting Nasr and flying him to Egypt for questioning.  If 
convicted, they face a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison.59 
Obviously, incidents such as these undermine the coalition against terror.  In order 
for the War on Terror to be successful, the US and its allies need to work closely together 
not only in their operations to capture or kill terrorist leaders, but also in working towards 
fostering democratic reforms.  However, critics argue that when America can be seen 
                                                
57 Gerard Fogarty, Guantánamo Bay: Undermining the Global War on Terror, Parameters: US Army War 
College Quarterly  The United States Armys Senior Professional Journal, Autumn 2005, pp. 54-71. 
58 Powell, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of the Geneva Convention 
to the Conflict in Afghanistan, 89. 
59 Stephen Grey and Don Van Natta Jr.,  Italian Anger Over U.S. Terror Tactics Deepens Rift, 
International Herald Tribune [On-line], Monday, June 27, 2005.  Available: 
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/06/26/news/cia.php>.  
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abandoning its democratic values, its checks and balances, its great legal traditions and 
becoming more autocratic and less accountable, how is that going to help foster 
democratic reforms elsewhere?  As Senator Patrick Leahy once observed,  Do as I say 
and not as I do is not a motto that has ever successfully inspired trust or credibility.60 
III  Future Consequences 
 Now that prior US practice and the present impacts of the Bush Administrations 
refusal to grant the Guantánamo detainees POW status have been examined, it is 
important to take a brief look at some of the consequences that this decision will likely 
have  not only in regards to the way in which the War on Terror is waged, but also on 
the way in which future conflicts will be affected. 
 One of the potential future consequences of the Administrations position was 
vocalized by the US Attorney General at the time, Alberto Gonzales, when he noted that 
concluding that the Geneva Convention does not apply may encourage other countries to 
look for technical loopholes in future conflicts to conclude that they are not bound by 
GPW either.61  In other words, this could very possibly lead to the weakening or even 
the disappearance of a landmark of humanity in international law.  The Geneva 
Conventions are the result of history, political experience and wisdom, military honor and 
interest, and universal ethical standards.  The Geneva Conventions are found at the core 
of the laws of war  which strikes a balance between military necessity and requirements 
of humanity.  Critics are concerned that disregarding the Geneva Conventions would 
cause a great loss for a body of international law that has reached an exceptional level of 
universal respectability.  By pushing these Conventions aside, the US will destroy much 
                                                
60 Leahy, Statement on the Military Commissions Act, September 28, 2006, para. 7. 
61 Gonzales, Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with 
al Qaeda and the Taliban, January 25, 2002, 86. 
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of the progress that has been made in the last 50 years in regards to human rights and 
warfare.  Colin Powells January 26, 2002 memo perhaps best articulates the critics 
overall reasoning as to why the Geneva Conventions provide the most flexible and 
suitable framework when compared to other laws that could arguably apply to the 
Guantánamo detainees: 
• By providing a more defensible legal framework, it preserves our 
flexibility under both domestic and international law. 
• It provides the strongest legal foundation for what we actually 
intend to do. 
• It presents a positive international posture, preserves US credibility 
and moral authority by taking the high ground, and puts us in a 
better position to demand and receive international support. 
• It maintains POW status for US forces, reinforces the importance 
of the Geneva Conventions, and generally supports the US 
objective of ensuring its forces are accorded protection under the 
Convention. 
• It reduced the incentives for international criminal investigations 
directed against US officials and troops.62 
 
3.5 - The Bush Administrations Strategic Reasoning for Maintaining its Position 
In spite of the long list of criticisms against the Administrations stance on the 
Guantánamo detainees, the Administration continues to defend its position for a number 
of strategical reasons.  In refusing to grant POW status to the prisoners, the US is able to 
gain tactical advantages in the following areas: (I) the conditions of detention, (II) the 
interrogation tactics used, (III) the terms of release, and (IV) the judicial proceedings. 
I  Conditions of Detention 
With regard to conditions of detention, the Bush Administration gains a couple of 
strategic advantages in refusing to grant the Guantánamo detainees POW status.  First, 
                                                
62 Powell, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of the Geneva Convention 
to the Conflict in Afghanistan, 89. 
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the US government wishes to keep the detainees more segregated from one another than 
the POW regimes provisions would permit.  According to Article 22 of the Third 
Geneva Convention, prisoners shall not be separated from prisoners of war belonging 
to the armed forces with which they were serving at the time of their capture, except with 
their consent.  However, the Administration has argued that keeping the detainees 
together has the potential of undermining their counter-terrorism strategy.  For example, 
in a legal briefing by Diane Beaver to the US Department of Defense on October 11, 
2002, she claims that because detainees have been able to communicate among 
themselves and debrief each other about their respective interrogations, their 
interrogation resistance strategies have become more sophisticated.63   
 A second strategic advantage that the US gains in its refusal to grant the 
Guantánamo detainees POW status is that it does not have to recognize certain POW 
privileges, such as the right to receive musical instruments or sports outfits.  This gives 
the US a financial advantage in that it does not have to spend any money on the detainees 
in regards to luxury items.  On February 7, 2002, the White House released a fact sheet 
on the status of the Guantánamo detainees which not only gave numerous detailed 
assurances about the treatment of these captives, but it also indicated that they would not 
receive some of the specific privileges normally afforded to POWs, including: 
• Access to a canteen to purchase food, soap, and tobacco; 
• A monthly advance of pay; 
• The ability to have and consult personal financial accountants, or; 
the ability to receive scientific equipment, musical instruments, or 
sports outfits.64 
                                                
63 Diane Beaver, Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies, October 11, 2002, in Mark 
Danner, Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terrorism, (New York: New York 
Review Books, 2004), 170. 
64 White House, Official Press Secretary, Fact Sheet of Detainees at Guantánamo, February 7, 2001.  
Available: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html>. 
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II - Interrogation Tactics 
The most contentious advantage of refusing to grant the detainees POW status, 
has to do with the questioning of the captives.  According to Article 17 of the Prisoner of 
War Convention, 
Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to 
give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and 
army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, 
equivalent information [In addition], no physical or mental 
torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on 
prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind 
whatever.  Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be 
threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant disadvantageous 
treatment of any kind. 
 
Unfortunately, one of the United States key strategies for combating terrorism 
lies in its ability to question and, even through a bit of coercion if necessary, obtain more 
information about terrorist operations from the Guantánamo detainees.  If granted POW 
status, these captives would have the right to maintain silence concerning their 
operations, the highly controversial interrogation methods would be forced to stop, and 
the Bush Administration would lose a potentially valuable counter-terrorism tool in 
regard to intelligence gathering.  In order to maximize the possibility of obtaining critical 
information for the Guantánamo detainees, the Administration modified its definition of 
what constitutes torture, and created a list of approved and prohibited interrogation 
tactics. 
i  Modified Definition of Torture 
 Following the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration quickly realized that the war 
on terrorism would not be decided by manpower or weaponry, as in the Second World 
War, but rather by locating terrorists and learning about when and where any future 
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attacks might come.  As John Arquilla, a professor of Defense Analysis at the US Naval 
Postgraduate School and a consultant to the Pentagon on terrorism once noted, this is a 
war in which intelligence is everything.  Winning or losing depends on it.65 
As a result of this, the Administration set out to search for ways to maximize its 
intelligence gathering capabilities.  Inter-office memos began to circulate around 
government departments and agencies, such as the White House, Pentagon and 
Department of Defense, how best to extract information from captured suspected 
terrorists.  On August 1, 2002, in a memo to Alberto Gonzales, the Assistant Attorney 
General, Jay S. Bybee redefined torture when he stated that 
we conclude that torture as defined and proscribed by Sections 
2340-2340A66, cover only extreme acts.  Severe pain is generally 
of the kind difficult for the victim to endure.  Where the pain is 
physical, it must be at an intensity akin to that which accompanies 
serious physical injury such as organ failure.  Severe mental pain 
requires suffering not just at the moment of infliction but also 
requires lasting psychological harm, such as seen in mental 
disorders like posttraumatic stress disorder.  Additionally, such 
severe mental pain can only arise from the predicated acts listed in 
section 2340.67  Because the acts inflicting torture are extreme, 
there is significant range of acts that though they might constitute 
cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment fail to rise 
to the level or torture.68  
 
 
 
                                                
65 Seymour Hersh, Chain of Command: The Road From 9/11 to Abu Ghraib, (New York: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 2004), p. 2. 
66 Sections 2340 & 2340A of the US Constitution define and proscribe torture.  A copy of the US 
Constitution is available on-line at: <http://www.usconstitution.net/const.html>. 
67 These predicated acts are: (a) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or 
suffering; (b) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind altering 
substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (c) the threat 
of imminent death; or (d) the threat that another person will immediately be subjected to death, severe 
physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other 
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.  
68 Jay Bybee, Memorandum for Alberto Gonzales Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, in Mark Danner Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War in Terror, 
(New York: New York Review Books, 2004), p. 155. 
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ii  Approved Interrogation Tactics 
 Shortly after Bybees memo made its rounds, Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld began to approve specific interrogation techniques for extracting information 
from Taliban and al Qaeda detainees being held at Camp X-Ray.  By April 2003, there 
was a list of 24 interrogation techniques that were approved by Rumsfeld69.  A few of 
these interrogations techniques are: 
• Fear up Harsh: Significantly increasing the fear level in a detainee. 
 
•  Futility: Invoking a felling of futility in a detainee. 
 
• We Know All: Convincing a detainee that the interrogator  already knows the  
                  answers to the questions that he is asking. 
 
• Establish Your Identity: Convincing a detainee that the interrogator has  
        mistaken him for someone else. 
 
• File and Dossier: Convincing a detainee that the interrogator has a damning 
and inaccurate file that must be fixed. 
 
• Environmental Manipulation: Altering the environment to create moderate  
        discomfort, such as by adjusting the temperature or introducing an unpleasant  
        smell. 
 
• Sleep Adjustment: Adjusting the sleeping times of a detainee. 
 
• False Flag: Convincing detainees that individuals from a country other than  
                 the US are interrogating them. 
        
• Isolation: Isolating a detainee from other detainees for up to 30 days. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
69 For a comprehensive list of Rumsfelds approved interrogation techniques, see Appendix 1. 
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iii - Prohibited Interrogation Tactics70 
 
 In spite of the fact that Donald Rumsfelds list of approved interrogation tactics 
appears to be quite extensive, there were a few interrogation tactics that were proposed 
by Guantánamo interrogators but were rejected straight away.  These include the use of 
scenarios designed to convince a detainee that death or severely painful consequences are 
imminent for him or his family; and exposing the prisoner to cold weather or cold water, 
with the appropriate medical monitoring.71  
 In addition to these, after being internationally criticized by groups such as the 
European Human Rights Commission, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch, 
Rumsfeld also banned a number of interrogation techniques that he had initially approved 
in December 2002.  In April 2003 the following interview techniques were placed on the 
rejected interrogation tactics list: 
• The forced shaving of the head or beard. 
• Hooding during transportation and interrogation. 
• Interrogations for up to 20 hours. 
• The use of mild, non injurious contact.     
• Stress positions, such as standing for prolonged periods of time. 
• Removing a detainees clothing. 
                                                
70 This list was extracted from a number of recently declassified interoffice memos that were circulated 
from August 1, 2002, to April 16, 2003.  They can all  be found in Mark Danners book, Torture and Truth: 
America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror, and include: Memo: Jay Bybee to Alberto Gonzales (August 
1, 2002); Memo: Lieutenant Commander (LTC) Jerald Phifer to Major General (MG) Michael Dunlavey 
(October 11, 2002); Memo: LTC Diane Beaver, Staff Judge Advocate, to MG Michael Dunlavey (October 
11, 2002); Memo: MG Michael Dunlavey to General James Hill (October 11, 2002); Memo: General James 
Hill to General Richard Myers (October 25, 2002); Memo: William Haynes II, General Council, to Donald 
Rumsfeld (December 2, 2002); Memo: Donald Rumsfeld to General James Hill (January 15, 2003); Memo: 
Donald Rumsfeld to William Haynes II (January 15, 2003), and; Memo: Donald Rumsfeld to General 
James Hill (April 16, 2003). 
71 Note: Waterboarding (the use of a wet towel and dripping to induce the misperception of suffocating) 
was also on Rumsfelds list of prohibited interrogation tactics.  However in February 2008, the Director of 
the CIA, Michael Hayden, publicly admitted to using waterboarding as an interrogation technique on some 
of the Guantánamo detainees (i.e. Khalid Shaikh Muhammad). 
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• The use of dogs to frighten a detainee. 
 
Through revising its definition of torture and creating a list of approved and  
 
prohibited interrogation tactics, the Bush Administration aimed to legitimize the  
 
interrogation methods being used on the Guantánamo detainees.  If the Administration  
 
were to grant the detainees POW status, these methods would become null and void and a  
 
valuable method of combating terrorism would be lost. 
 
III  Release of Prisoners 
 
 A third area where the US gains a strategic advantage in refusing to grant POW  
 
status to the Guantánamo detainees concerns their eventual release.   The Third  
 
Geneva Convention codifies a practice that is normally followed after a war  the release  
 
and repatriation of POWs.  By labeling the detainees illegal enemy combatants rather  
 
than POWs, the Bush Administration is able to avoid three potential problems.  In his  
 
article, The Laws of War, Adam Roberts summarizes these as follows: 
 
First, there may not be a clear end of hostilities: Although the war 
in Afghanistan may be concluded at a definite date, it may be 
decades before the war on terror can be declared to be over for 
the United States.  Second, unlike POWs in a normal inter-state 
war, some of the prisoners concerned might continue to be 
extremely dangerous after release given their training, their 
motivation to commit acts of terrorism, and lack of government 
control over them.  Third, their countries of origin might refuse to 
accept them back, except perhaps as prisoners.72  
 
In other words, from a strategic point, the US has enabled itself to hold the detainees for 
an unlimited amount of time, even without bringing charges against them - so long as the 
Administration maintains that these detainees pose a threat to the United States national 
security and that they do not meet the requirements to receive POW status.   
                                                
72 Roberts, Laws of War, 208. 
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IV  Judicial Proceedings  
 The Bush Administrations decisions on the Supreme Courts judicial proceedings 
relating to the Guantánamo detainees have been the subject of considerable legal and 
political debate, in the US and elsewhere, with regard to their constitutionality, 
practicability, and advisability.  In spite of this, the Administration continues to deny 
these captives POW status for a number of strategic reasons. 
First, Article 5 of the Prisoner of War Convention clearly states that if there is any 
doubt whatsoever as to the status of a captured combatant, then that combatant is entitled 
to the protections and rights of a POW until their actual status has been determined by a 
competent tribunal.  However, shortly after the captives began to arrive at Camp X-Ray, 
President George W. Bush was advised not to apply the Prisoner of War Convention to 
any of the Taliban or al Qaeda detainees.  In fact, on January 25, 2002, Albert Gonzales, 
then a White House Counsel, sent the President a memo in which he stated that, a 
determination that GPW does not apply to al Qaeda and the Taliban eliminates any 
argument regarding the case-by-case determinations of POW status.73  In other words, 
the interpretation of the Bush Administration was that the Geneva Conventions obliged 
belligerents to convene a competent tribunal to review  
the combatant status of prisoners only when their status was in doubt.  Since the 
Administration was sure that the prisoners did not qualify for POW status, there was no 
need for a review. 
Secondly, by regarding all of the detainees as illegal enemy combatants rather 
than POWs, the Bush Administration is able to substantially reduce the threat of domestic 
                                                
73 Alberto Gonzales, Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the 
Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban, January 25, 2002, in Mark Danner, Torture and Truth: America, 
Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror, (New York: New York Review Books, 2004), 84. 
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prosecution under the War Crimes Act.  The War Crimes Act of 1996 was signed into 
law by President Clinton once it was passed by the United States Congress with an 
overwhelming majority.  This Act defines a war crime to include a grave breach of the 
Geneva Conventions, and applies if either the victim or perpetrator is an American 
national or a member of the US Armed Forces.   If found guilty or committing a war 
crime, a penalty as stiff as life imprisonment or even death may be imposed. 
Because an illegal enemy combatant is arguably not covered by the Geneva 
Conventions, any actions taken with respect to the Guantánamo detainees could fall 
outside of the War Crimes Act.  In addition, Gonzaless January 25, 2002 memo to the 
President also notes that by determining that the Prisoners of War Convention (GPW) 
does not apply to these captives, the Bush Administration would be guarded effectively 
from misconstruction or misapplication of the War Crimes Act for several reasons: 
• First, some of the language of the GPW is undefined (it prohibits 
for example, outrages upon personal dignity and inhumane 
treatment), and it is difficult to predict with confidence what 
actions might be deemed to constitute violations of the relevant 
provisions of GPW. 
• Second, it is difficult to predict the needs and circumstances that 
could arise in the course of the war on terrorism. 
• Third, it is difficult to predict the motives of prosecutors and 
independent councils who may in the future decide to pursue 
unwarranted changes based on [the War Crimes Act].  Your 
determination would create a reasonable basis in the law that [the 
War Crimes Act] does not apply, which would provide a solid 
defense to any future prosecution.74    
 
A third strategic advantage that is gained in refusing to grant the Guantánamo 
detainees POW status is that the Administration is able to avoid a number of problems 
that could potentially arise if they were to follow the judicial procedures which are 
                                                
74 Gonzales, Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoner of War to the Conflict with al 
Qaeda and the Taliban, 85. 
 45 
 
outlined in the Third Geneva Convention.  Article 82 of this Convention clearly specifies 
that any sentence of a POW must be by the same courts according to the same 
procedures as in the case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power.  If the 
US were to follow this provision, then the detainees cases would be handled through 
regular US military courts.  Consequentially, if tried using the military courts, the 
detainees would be able to appeal any decisions made against them.75  The potential 
problem for the Bush Administration is that the appeals procedure could provide 
opportunity for the Guantánamo detainees and their lawyers to prolong the legal process 
and attract publicity. 
Another potential problem is outlined by Adam Roberts in his article, The Laws 
of War.  He notes that the Administration was also concerned that,  
in cases involving defendants with no documents and no willingness to 
collaborate in any of the procedures, and where evidence might be based 
largely on intelligence sources, it could be difficult to provide evidence that 
met high standards of proof of direct personal involvement in terrorist 
activities.76 
 
In addition, by allowing the proceedings to take place in an open court, members of al 
Qaeda and other terrorist groups would have the opportunity to learn valuable 
information from the evidence presented.  For example, they could become familiarized 
with the strengths and weaknesses of the US methods of intelligence gathering. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
75 The normal procedure for US armed forces personnel is through the appellate court of each service, then 
through the US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and then on to the Supreme Court. 
76 Roberts, The Laws of War, 209. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE LEGAL MERRY-GO-ROUND 
 
The debate over the legal status and rights of the Guantánamo detainees has 
become so intense that some of the core issues of the debate have made their way up to 
the Supreme Court of the United States.  Remarkably, when the Administration disagreed 
with the Supreme Courts rulings, it had the ability to adopt new legislation which 
essentially rendered the Courts decision null and void.  The implementation of the 2006 
Military Commissions Act (MCA) is and example of this.  The MCA is extremely 
important because it will have a profound impact on the way in which the war on terror is 
conducted.  In addition, it will likely have a lasting effect in the way in which future 
conflicts are waged as well.  Before examining the MCA and the advantages that it 
affords to the Bush Administration, it is important to take a brief look at the key events 
which led up to its ultimate creation. 
4.1 - The Creation of the 2006 Military Commissions Act  
I  Rasul vs. Bush 
 Shortly after the prisoners began to arrive at Camp X-Ray, the Center for 
Constitutional Rights filed a habeas corpus77 petition entitled Rasul vs. Bush in the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court.  This petition represented two Australians and twelve 
Kuwaitis (including Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and David Hicks), who were captured 
during hostilities in Afghanistan and were being held in US military custody at the 
Guantánamo Bay naval base.  Unfortunately for these detainees, the Administration 
argued, and the court agreed, that under the 1950 Supreme Court case Johnson vs.  
                                                
77 Habeas corpus is one of the oldest principles of English and American law.  Latin for you have body it 
requires the government to show a legal basis for holding a prisoner. 
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Eisentrager,78 the privilege of litigation does not extend to aliens in military custody 
who have no presence in any territory over which the United States is sovereign.79 
 In spite of this, Rasul vs. Bush eventually made its way to the United States 
Supreme Court.  After much deliberation, the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the 
Guantánamo detainees can, in fact, use federal courts to challenge their captivity.  
Jennifer Elsea and Kenneth Thomas sum up the Supreme Courts decision best in their 
report, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court: 
[US courts do have] jurisdiction over the Guantánamo detainees 
based on the facts that Guantánamo is effectively a US territory 
and is far removed from any hostilities, and that the detainees are 
being held indefinitely without the benefit of any legal proceeding 
to determine their status.  Noting that the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
(Writ) has evolved as the primary means to challenge executive 
detentions, especially those without trial, the Court held that 
jurisdiction over habeas petitions does not turn sovereignty over to 
the territory where the detainees are held.  Even if the habeas 
statute were presumed not to extend extraterritorially, as the 
government urged, the Court found the complete jurisdiction and 
control the United States exercises under its lease with Cuba would 
suffice to bring detainees within the territorial and historical scope 
of the Writ.80 
 
II  Combatant Status Review Tribunals  
 In response to the Supreme Courts decision in the Rasul vs. Bush case, the 
Pentagon announced the creation of Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) to 
                                                
78 In Johnson vs. Eisentrager, German nationals convicted by military commissions in China of violating 
the laws of war and imprisoned in a US administered prison in Germany, sought writs of habeas corpus on 
the ground that the military commission violated their rights under the constitution and their rights under 
the 1929 Geneva Convention.  In their ruling, the Supreme Court based their decision to prohibit these 
detainees from claiming habeas corpus  on three important points: (1) A non-resident alien has no access to 
US courts during wartime; (2) The US Constitution does not confer a right of personal security or immunity 
from military trial and punishment upon an alien engaged in hostile service of a government at war with the 
US, and; (3)  Non-resident enemy aliens, captured and imprisoned abroad, have no right to a writ of habeas 
corpus in the US.  
79 Jennifer Elsea & Kenneth Thomas, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal 
Court, in the Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, September 26, 2006, p. 3.  Available: 
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33180.pdf>. 
80 Ibid., 3. 
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determine each of the detainees enemy combatant status.  As noted in a Department of 
Defense news release, these tribunals were created to serve as a forum for the captives to 
contest their status as enemy combatants.  In addition, by establishing the CSRTs, the 
Administration was able to meet the obligation of Article 5 of the Geneva Prisoner of 
War Convention.81  If the tribunal made a determination that a detainee was not an enemy 
combatant, then the detainee was to be released and transferred to their country of 
citizenship or other disposition consistent with domestic and international obligations, as 
well as US foreign policy.  However, if the CSRT found that the detainee was, in fact, an 
enemy combatant, then that detainee would be deemed eligible for trial by military 
commission.82 
 On the surface the formation of the CSRTs looks like a positive step forward in 
assuring that the detainees rights to due process are being met.  However, it is important 
to note that these hearings are inherently flawed.  To date, they have all been conducted 
based on the assertion by the Presidents Administration that detainees in the war on 
Afghanistan are not eligible for prisoner of war status according to the terms of Article 4 
of the Prisoner of War Convention.83  As a result, any detainees are automatically to be 
regarded as unlawful enemy combatants.   
 
                                                
81 Article 5 of the Prisoner of War Convention: Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having 
committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories 
enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present convention until such time as 
their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.  
82 US Department of Defense news release, Combatant Status Review Tribunal Order Issued, July 7, 
2004.  Available: <http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspz?releaseid=7530>. 
 
83 In order to be considered a POW, Article 4 of the Prisoner of War Convention states that a detainee must 
meet the following four criteria: (a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly, and; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
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III  Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld 
 One of the detainees who was judged to be an enemy combatant following his 
CSRT was Salim Ahmed Hamdan.  As George Fletcher notes in his article, The Hamdan 
Case and Conspiracy as a War Crime, 
Hamdan was a Yemeni living in Afghanistan and for reasons of 
ideology and economic need, he served as bin Ladens personal 
driver for about 5 years leading up to 9/11.  Other than drive his 
boss around and attend some meetings, he did nothing more to 
promote the attacks of 9/11.  Yet his driving and his knowledge of 
al Qaedas nefarious purposes struck the military as sufficient to 
charge him with entering a conspiracy to kill civilians and engage 
in other terrorist acts.84   
 
Because of this, Hamdans trial by military commission began in Guantánamo 
Bay in the late summer of 2004.  From the start, the prosecution tried to exclude him 
from the room during the testimony of a witness against him.  Obviously this was 
because the government wanted to protect its sources.  Unfortunately, this unusual 
procedure (which is permitted in the Department of Defense regulation governing 
military commissions), is in stark contrast to the widely accepted cannons of federal, 
constitutional and international law.  As a result, the defense immediately sought an 
injunction in federal court to prevent the trial from continuing.  The defenses efforts paid 
off when on November 8, 2004, US District Judge James Robertson ordered the Pentagon 
to halt Hamdans trial, stating that the military commissions were unlawful and could not 
continue in their current form.85 
                                                
84 George Fletcher, The Hamdan Case and Conspiracy as a War Crime: A New Beginning for 
International Law in the US, Journal of International Criminal Justice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), p. 443. 
85 Carol Leonnig & John Mintz, Judge Says Detainees Trials are Unlawful: Ruling is Setback for Bush 
Policy, The Washington Post, November 9, 2004, p. A01. 
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 The defenses victory was short lived, however.  On July 15, 2005 the US District 
Court of Appeals unanimously upheld President Bushs power to create military 
commissions to try Hamdan, thereby overturning Judge Robertsons November 8th order.  
In response, Hamdans military lawyer, Navy Lt. Cmdr. Charles Swift denounced the 
military commission set up to try Hamdan as a kangaroo court.  In addition, seven 
retired senior military officers and lawyers warned in a joint statement that if the military 
commissions were allowed to proceed unchecked, then it is very possible that foreign 
tyrants would organize similar court hearings for US military personnel and hide their 
oppression under US precedent.86  
These warnings did not go unheeded, and on November 7, 2005, the Supreme 
Court announced that it was going to hear the Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld case to decide 
whether or not President Bush has the power to set up military commissions, and whether 
or not detainees facing military trials could go to court in the United States to secure 
protections granted in the Geneva Conventions.  After much deliberation, on June 29, 
2006, the Court ruled 5-3 that the military commissions system for Guantánamo Bay did, 
in fact, violate US and international law because it had the power to convict based on 
evidence the accused would never see or hear.87  As a result, President Bush did not 
have the sole authority to hold tribunals and needed to get authorization from Congress to 
do so. 
 
 
                                                
86 Jeffrey Smith, Detainees Trials are Upheld: Court Backs Bush on Military Panels, The Washington 
Post, July 16, 2005, p. A01. 
87 Supreme Court of the United States.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et. al., Argued 
March 28, 2006  Decided June 29, 2006.  Available: <http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-
184.pdf>. 
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IV The  Military Commissions Act of 2006 
 In response to the Supreme Courts ruling in Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld, the Bush 
Administration pressed Congress to pass a bill to legalize the Guantánamo military 
commissions, and to endorse many of the methods used by US intelligence officers to get 
information from terrorist suspects.  As a result, the Military Commissions Act gained the 
approval of Congress on September 29, 2006.  The Senate joined the House in embracing 
Bushs view that the battle against terrorism justifies the imposition of extraordinary 
limits on a defendants traditional rights in the courtroom.88  In order to underline this 
belief, the newly formulated Military Commissions Act (MCA) includes restrictions on a 
suspects ability to challenge his detention, examine all evidence against him, and bar 
testimony allegedly acquired through coercion of witnesses. 
On October 17, 2006, President Bush signed the Military Commissions Act into 
law.  He said that the extraordinary measure was justified by the extraordinary 
circumstances of the fight against terrorism.  It is a rare occasion when a president can 
sign a bill he knows will save American lives, he said before signing the measure.  I 
have that privilege this morning.89  
4.2 - The Military Commissions Act & the Administrations Position 
The MCA has essentially given the Administration the legal footing that it needs 
to continue to maintain its initial position.  The two most notable areas that 
Administration benefits from the provisions of the MCA is in regard to the judicial 
procedures and interrogation methods used on the Guantánamo detainees. 
                                                
88 Charles Babington & Jonathan Weisman, Senate Approves Detainee Bill Backed by Bush, The 
Washington Post, September 29, 2006, p. A01. 
89 Michael Fletcher, Bush Signs Terrorism Measure: New Law Governs Interrogation, Prosecution of 
Detainees, The Washington Post, October 18, 2006, p. A04. 
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I - Military Commissions 
In order to dissipate these potential problems that accompanied normal judicial 
procedures, the MCA makes provisions for trial by military commissions instead.  Under 
most justice systems, prisoners have a variety of rights.  These rights include the right to 
know the evidence against them; the right to protect themselves against self-
incrimination; the right to legal counsel; the right to be present during their trial, and; the 
right to have witnesses against them cross-examined.  However, the Bush 
Administrations Military Commissions Act of 200690 has taken away most of these 
prisoners rights.  In these military commissions, rules for admissible evidence are more 
lenient than in civilian and military courts.  For example, hearsay and coerced testimony 
are admissible.  In addition, the prosecution is able to keep the evidence secret from the 
defendant and his/her lawyer.91 
Military commissions can also be held in secret, and are not open to the public, 
and unlike US civil and military courts, decisions made by military commissions cannot 
be appealed to federal courts.  It is possible, however, to petition for a panel of review to 
look into an appeal.  Ultimately though, as Commander in Chief the President has the 
final word over any appeals.  In addition, only members of the executive branch are 
involved in the trial  no impartial arbiter is provided. 
By denying POW status to the Guantánamo detainees, the Bush Administration 
has been able to evade the traditional methods of prosecuting captives involved in 
                                                
90 On September 28th and 29th, 2006, the US Senate and the US House of Representatives, respectively, 
passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006  a highly controversial bill that allows the President to 
designate certain people with the status of illegal enemy combatants, there by making them subject to 
military commissions in which they have fewer civil rights that in regular trials. 
91 American Civil Liberties Union, Military Commissions Act.  Available On-line: 
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/detention/commissions.html. 
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international conflict.  In addition, the Military Commissions Act has helped in limiting 
the detainees ability to prolong the legal process through appeals and attract unwanted 
publicity.  In essence, the Administration has had much to gain in denying the 
Guantánamo detainees POW status and introducing the Military Commissions Act. 
II - The Military Commissions Act and Torture 
One of the advantages that the Military Commissions Act gives to the 
Administration is that, although it does spell out specific interrogation techniques that are 
forbidden, it also grants retroactive legal protection to military and intelligence personnel 
who previously participated in rough questioning of terrorism suspects.  In addition, the 
Act also allows the Administration to continue a once secret CIA program for detaining 
people suspected of terrorism and using tough interrogation techniques on those believed 
to have information about plots against the United States.  However, Bush claims that 
these measures are justified because 
This program has been one of the most successful intelligence 
efforts in American history.  It has helped prevent attacks on our 
country.  And [it] will ensure that we can continue using this 
vital tool to protect the American people for years to come.92 
 
4.3 - Criticisms of the Military Commissions Act 
In spite of President Bushs confidence in the Act, this legislation is already being 
challenged by several lawsuits.  This issue is clearly going to be in the courts for years, 
said Anthony Romero, executive director of American Civil Liberties Union.  It is 
unconstitutional and un-American.93  Remarkably, some of the opposition towards the 
                                                
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
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Act has come from within the United States government itself.  As Vermonts Senator, 
Patrick Leahy, passionately stated, 
Passing laws that remove the few checks against the mistreatment 
of prisoners will not help us win the battle for the hearts and minds 
of the generation of young people around the world being recruited 
by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda.  Authorizing indefinite 
detention of anybody the government designates  without any 
proceeding and without any recourse  if what our worst critics 
claim the United States would so, not what American values, 
traditions and our rule of law would have us do. 
 
This is not just a bad bill, this is a dangerous bill.94  
 
 Instead of promoting the legal and human rights of the Guantánamo detainees, 
critics argue that the Military Commissions Act actually legalizes the Administrations 
disregard for these rights.  The majority of the opposition to this Act is essentially based 
upon three arguments I) on the grounds that the Act is unconstitutional; II) on the 
grounds that the Act is also applicable to US citizens, and; III) on a series of other 
grounds. 
I - The Act is Unconstitutional 
 As Karen DeYoung noted in an article in The Washington Post, by signing into 
the law the Military Commissions Act the Administration has formally notified the 
US District Court that it no longer has jurisdiction to consider hundreds of habeas corpus 
petitions filed by inmates at the Guantánamo Bay prison in Cuba.95   
 Habeas corpus is one of the oldest principles of English and American law.  Latin 
for you have the body, it requires the government to show a legal basis for holding a 
prisoner.  The Military Commissions Act, however, includes a provision which removes 
                                                
94 Statement of Patrick Leahy on the Military Commissions Act, S. 3939.  September 28,2006.  
Available:http://lwahy.senate.gov/press/200609/092806c.html>. 
95 Karen De Young, Court Told it Lacks Power in Detainee Cases,  The Washington Post, October 20, 
2006; A18, para. 1. 
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judicial review of all habeas claims.96  This has caused a number of both current and 
former diplomats, military lawyers, federal judges, law professors and law school deans, 
the American Bar Association, former US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and even 
President Bushs former Solicitor General, Kenneth Star, to voice grave concerns with 
the stripping of the habeas corpus provisions of the Act.97  As Wisconsin Senator Russell 
Feingold stated in a 2006 speech to Congress,  
 
Many, many dedicated patriotic Americans have grave reservations 
about this particular provision of the bill.  They have reservations 
not because they sympathize with suspected terrorists. Not because 
they are soft on national security. Not because they don't 
understand the threat we face. No. [We] are concerned about this 
provision because we care about the Constitution, because we care 
about the image that America presents to the world as we fight the 
terrorists. Because we know that the writ of habeas corpus 
provides one of the most significant protections of human freedom 
against arbitrary government action ever created. If we sacrifice it 
here, we will head down a road that history will judge harshly and 
our descendants will regret.98 
 
II -  The Act Applies to US Citizens 
 The Military Commissions Act has also been denounced by critics who assert that 
its wording makes possible the permanent detention and torture of anyone  including 
American citizens  based on the decision of the President.  Because of the broad 
language used, critics argue that the Act allows for too much unchecked presidential 
power, and as a result of this undermines the basic principles of democracy itself. 
                                                
96 Military Commissions Act of 2006, S. 950j. Finality of Proceedings, Findings, and Sentences, (b). 
97 David Welna, Senators Spar Over Restoring Habeas Corpus, National Public Radio.  Available On-
Line at: < http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7779879>.  
98
 Russell Feingold, Examining Proposals to Limit Guantánamo Detainees Access to Habeas Corpus 
Review, Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred and Ninth 
Congress, Second Session, September 25, 2006, Page S10361.  Available: 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/habeas.html> 
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 According to Bill Goodman, Legal Director of the Center for Constitutional 
Rights, and Joanne Marnier, the Deputy Director of the Americas division of Human 
Rights Watch, this act redefines unlawful enemy combatant in such a broad way that it 
refers to any person who is engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially 
supported hostilities against the United States.99  Consequently, this makes it possible 
for US citizens to be designated unlawful enemy combatants because it could be read 
to include anyone who has donated money to a charity for orphans in Afghanistan that 
turns out to have some connection to the Taliban or a person organizing an anti-war 
protest in Washington, D.C.100  As a result of this many critics argue that the Military 
Commissions Act sends the wrong message not only to the international community, but 
also  in particular  to the American public at large.  
III -  Other Grounds 
The Military Commissions Act has been criticized on a number of other grounds.  
First, as Amnesty International was quick to point out, this Act contravenes human 
rights principles.101  Amnesty Internationals reasons for determining this are, among 
other things, that the Act will: 
• Permit the executive to convene military commissions to try alien 
unlawful combatants, as determined by the executive under a 
dangerously broad definition, in trials that would provide foreign 
nationals so labeled with a lower standard of justice than US 
citizens accused of the same crimes.  This would violate the 
prohibition on the discriminatory application of their rights. 
                                                
99 Military Commissions Act of 2006, S. 948a. Definitions, 7(a). 
100 Joanne Mariner, Military Commissions Act of 2006: A Short Premier  Part One of a Two-Part 
Series, Findlaw [On-line] October 9, 2006.  Available: 
<http://writ.news.findlaw.com/mariner/20061009.html>. 
101 Amnesty International.  US Congress Gives Green Light to Human Rights Violations in the War on 
Terror, September 29, 2006.  Available: <http://web.amnesty.org/pages/stoptorture-060930-features-
eng>.  For a list of things that Amnesty International thinks that every one should know about the Military 
Commissions Act, see Table 3.1. 
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• Permit the use in military commission trials of evidence extracted 
under cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
• Give the military commissions the power to hand down death 
sentences after trials that did not meet international standards. 
• Permit the executive to determine who is an enemy combatant 
under any competent tribunal established by the executive, and 
endorse the Combatant Status Review Tribunal, the wholly 
inadequate administrative procedure that has been employed in 
Guantánamo to review individual detentions. 
• Prohibit any person from invoking the Geneva Conventions or 
their protocols as a source of rights in any action in any US court. 
• Narrow the scope of the War Crimes Act by not expressly 
criminalizing acts that constitute outrages upon personal dignity, 
particularly humiliating and degrading treatment banned under 
international law.  Amnesty International believes that the USA 
has routinely failed to respect the human dignity of detainees in the 
war on terror. 
• Endorse the Administrations war paradigm  under which the 
USA has selectively applied the laws of war and rejected 
international human rights law.  The legislation would backdate the 
war on terror to before the 11 September 2001 in order to be able 
to try individuals in front of military commissions for war crimes 
committed before that date.102       
  
In addition, many critics believe that the Military Commissions Act undermines 
the basic foundations of democracy.  As Jonathan Turley argued, this Act is 
a huge sea of change for our democracy.  The framers created a 
system where we did not have to rely on the good mood of the 
president.  In fact, Madison said that he created a system 
essentially to be run by devils, where they could do no harm, 
because we didnt rely on their good motivations.  Now we 
must.103 
                
Finally, many critics worry about how investigations into possible wrongdoings in 
the War on Terror will likely be conducted by members of the international community 
rather than from within the US itself.  For example, the Center for Constitutional Rights 
and the International Federation for Human Rights have begun legal proceedings in 
                                                
102 Ibid. 
103 Keith Olbermann, interview with Jonathan Turley.  National Yawn as Our Rights Evaporate: New Law 
Redefines Habeas Corpus; Law Professor explains on Countdown.  October 18, 2006.  Available: 
<http://www.msnbs.msn.com/id/15318240>. 
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Germany against Donald Rumsfeld, former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, former 
CIA director George Tenet, and other senior US civilian and military officers, for their 
alleged roles in the abuses committed at Iraqs Abu Ghraib prison and the US detention 
facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
104 Adam Zagorin, Exclusive Charges Sought Against Rumsfeld Over Prison Abuse, Time Magazine 
[On-line].  November 10, 2006.  Available: 
<http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1557842.00.html>. 
 59 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1  The Administrations Actions and the Consequences    
The international terrorist threat to the United States and allied interests was 
demonstrated dramatically on September 11, 2001, but the formulation of an effective 
grand strategy to respond has yet to be fashioned.  Finding such a response will likely be 
challenging because, as Ron Wheeler once noted, the shadowy nature of terrorism, its 
transnational character, and its threat to both the safety of civilians and the sanctity of the 
political process present a difficult challenge for democratic governments.105  The Bush 
Administrations immediate response to the attacks was to initiate a war on terrorism.  
President Bush claimed that this was a war that would not end until every terrorist 
group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.106 
 Since the war on terrorism began, thousands of suspected terrorists have been 
captured by the US and allied forces.  Of these, those deemed to be the most dangerous 
have been transported to Camp X-Ray in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.  From the time the first 
pictures of these detainees arriving at Camp X-Ray were made public, the US handling of 
questions and concerns relating to the treatment and legal status of prisoners in the war 
on terror has caused widespread concern and criticism.  In order to better understand 
some of the major difficulties, challenges, and debates involved with the issue over which 
status to afford to the Guantánamo detainees, several critical questions were posed at the  
 
                                                
105 Ron Wheeler, A Fourth Option for International Morality in an Age of Terror, in The University of 
Saskatchewans, The 2003 Whelen Lecture Featuring Michael Ignatieff, (Saskatoon, Sk.: University of 
Saskatchewan Extended Division, 2004), 19. 
106 David C. Rapoport, The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism, in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. 
Ludes, Eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2004), 46. 
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beginning of the thesis: 
1  What are President Bushs strategic reasons for refusing to grant the  
       Guantánamo detainees POW status?  
2  What are the counter-arguments to the Bush Administrations  
       position?  Who is voicing these arguments and why? 
3  What impact does the Bush Administrations position have on how  
       and to what extent the war on terror is waged? 
Each of these questions is important to consider when analyzing the legal status and 
treatment of prisoners in the war on terror because they offer separate and distinct 
insights into the war and its changing nature. 
 Through exploring the first question it has become possible to distinguish some of 
the fundamental changes that have taken place in the way in which war is now being 
conducted.  For example, since the war on terrorism began, there have been ample 
grounds for questioning whether military operations involving actions against terrorists 
constitute a new or wholly distinct category of war.  The coalition operations of 
Afghanistan and the larger war against terrorism of which they are apart are not 
completely unlike past wars.  In fact, many forms of military action and issues raised 
since September 11, 2001, are quite similar to those that have been brought up in 
previous military operations and concern issues already addressed by the laws of war. 
 However, since the war in Afghanistan began in October 2001, it has become 
painfully clear that there are difficulties in applying the laws of war to counterterrorist 
operations.  For example, a war that is centered around ending terrorism by capturing 
suspected terrorists involves many complex issues which the existing laws of war do not 
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address.  And yet, abiding by the law, whether it be domestic or international, only when 
it best suits your interests, risks creating a whole new set of problems.  The principle of 
reciprocity in the observance of laws is extremely important and valuable.  If the US is 
perceived as ignoring certain basic norms, then there will likely be negative 
consequences in regard to their relationships with their allies as well as with their 
enemies.  Failure to strictly adhere to previously accepted laws may also affect the 
conduct of states in other conflicts.  It also involves endangering respect for the rights of 
Americans who may be taken prisoner in the future.  Although some of the 
Administrations critics agree that a couple of the US positions are defensible  such as 
the contention that certain prisoners would not qualify for POW status as prescribed by 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions  they argue that many aspects of US policy and 
procedures are poorly presented, and in some instances do not appear to be fully thought 
out.   
The legal status, treatment, and rights of prisoners have become significant issues 
in the war on terror.  If it is perceived that the US is treating prisoners inhumanely, or 
regarding their treatment and status as being in international legal limbo, then there is the 
risk of a general weakening of the prisoner of war regime.  In addition, the treatment and 
legal status given to the detainees could have serious implications for any coalition 
personnel taken prisoner in the future. 
On examination of the Administrations strategic reasons for not granting the 
Guantánamo detainees POW status and the counter-arguments to the Administrations 
position, it is obvious that the development of human rights protections are characterized 
by a continuous tension.  On one hand, the global community is structured in accordance 
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with the principle of state sovereignty.  On the other hand, there are certain standards of 
human dignity that have a degree of authority in the relations between states.  Although 
states do recognize that they can be held accountable by other states and by international 
organizations for the manner in which they observe human rights, the boundaries 
between state sovereignty and human dignity are not always clear. 
The tension between state sovereignty and human rights became quite apparent 
following the events of 9/11.  Since these attacks, numerous well-documented violations 
of international human rights law have occurred.  The United States passed emergency 
legislation allowing the executive branch and police to circumvent the accepted 
principles of human rights, including liberal democracy and the rule of law.  Since 9/11, 
these actions have been and continue to be justified by the war on terror. 
 The Administrations position on the prisoner issue has also had a huge impact on 
the way in which the war on terror is conducted.  Because of the transnational nature of 
terrorism, the war on terrorism has necessitated that the US government cooperate with 
many governments, in every region of the world.  Specific forms of cooperation have 
ranged from allowing US investigators access to suspected terrorists captured abroad to 
joining the US in military action in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Unfortunately, the US 
handling of detainees in the war on terror has ultimately led to a weakening of 
international solidarity.  For example, a number of Americas allies may become hesitant 
to handing over any of the detainees that they capture during the course of the war on 
terror because they are unsure whether or not these prisoners will be treated humanely or 
afforded their proper rights. 
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5.2  Where Do We Go From Here? 
In order to have even a chance at effectively combating terrorism, international 
cooperation is essential.  Unfortunately, crafting a grand strategy against a non-state 
threat such as terrorism will be extremely challenging.  A global war centered around 
counter-terrorist operations against non-state actors has never been conducted before.  
Previously agreed upon laws of war do not adequately cover all of the complexities 
associated with the war on terror. 
Fortunately, in the past, international agreements have almost always been born 
out of major conflict.  As David Bederman points out in his book International Law 
Frameworks: 
One can almost linearly chart the progress of new international 
organizations, new substantive rules of international conflict and 
new procedures of dispute settlement between international actors 
by the dates that mark the end of cataclysmic wars: The 1763 
Definitive Peace (concluding the Seven Years of War), the 1815 
Final Act of Vienna (ending the wars of the French Revolution and 
Napoleon, 1791-1815), the 1919 Treaty of Versailles and the 
Covenant League (completing the First World War, 1914-1918), 
and the 1945 Charter of the United Nations (marking the end of 
World War Two, 1939-1945).  It thus appears that international 
law is the step-child of war and destruction offering a utopian hope 
of order and moral renewal.107    
 
It appears as though the war on terror will be no exception to this trend.  Although most 
would agree that this war is unlike anything the world has ever experienced, the manner 
in which to respond is heavily debated.    
The Bush Administrations approach to the war on terror has proven to be 
reckless.  It promotes a multilateral approach, but is quick to proceed unilaterally if it 
suits its own interests.  The Administration has disregarded both domestic and 
                                                
107 David Bederman, International Law Frameworks, (New York: Foundation Press, 2001), 3. 
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international law, and has even created new laws, such as the 2006 Military Commissions 
Act, when the Supreme Court deems their actions to be illegal and unconstitutional.  It is 
certainly understandable that, in times of fear, the citizenry defers to authority and closes 
its eyes against the wrong perpetrated in the name of their protection.  However, when 
prevention translates into the detention and punishment of individuals for what the 
government suspects they may do rather than what it can prove they have done, it cannot 
be justified in a democratic society. 
Ultimately, the security threat posed by terrorism should not obscure the 
importance of human rights.  As Benjamin Franklin once noted, they that can give up 
essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.  An 
anti-terrorism policy that ignores human rights is a gift to terrorists.  It reaffirms the 
violent instrumentation that breeds terrorism as it undermines the public support needed 
to defeat it.  A strong human rights policy that respects the detainees right to due process 
and right to not be subjected to torture, cannot replace the actions of security forces, but it 
is an essential compliment.  A successful anti-terrorism policy must endeavor to build 
strong international norms and institutions on human rights, not provide a new rationale 
for avoiding and undermining them.  Although the Military Commissions Act may 
provide the US with some short term security, in the long run the Act can do nothing 
more than erode both domestic and international human rights that have taken centuries 
to form. 
 The treatment and legal status that the Administration has denied to the 
Guantánamo detainees is in violation of both domestic and international law.  The 
safeguards of the criminal process were put into place for a reason, and whenever a 
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democratic government imposes punishment or deprives a person of their liberty without 
adhering to these principles, it does more harm than good.  In addition, the 
Administrations presumption of a right to hold these detainees until the war on terrorism 
is over is absurd. The global war on terrorism will never be over because it is based on 
defeating all terrorist organizations of global reach, and not just al Qaeda. Terrorism has 
been used as a tactic for centuries, and it is not likely to disappear over night. 
 With respect to the Guantánamo detainees, the Bush Administration is openly 
disregarding the legal framework that is fundamental, not only to the defendants rights, 
but to the rights of all people.  As Michael Ratner points out its assertion of the power to 
imprison people indefinitely, without charges and court review, is the very conduct that 
the United States has forcefully condemned in other countries.108  Having the 
Administration ignore the illegality of executive detention undercuts a system of justice 
and procedures that is necessary in insuring that only the guilty are punished. 
 In addition, any use of torture or methods of interrogation parallel to torture 
should be abhorrent to all societies who call themselves civilized.  As Pope Pius XII once 
said, the treatment of prisoners of war and of the civilian population of occupied areas is 
the most certain measure and index of the civilization of a people and a nation.109  Pope 
Pius words still ring true today, and without respect for the international and US legal 
framework, the rights of the Guantánamo detainees will continue to be violated and, as a 
result, threaten the rights of others who depend on the fair application of the law. 
 
                                                
108 Michael Ratner, The War on Terrorism: The Guantánamo Prisoners, Military Commissions, and 
Torture, in Cynthia Brown, ed., Lost Liberties: Ashcroft and the Assault on Personal Freedom, (New 
York: The New York Press, 2003), 150. 
109 Levie, Howard Levie, Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict,  (Washington, D.C.: Naval 
War College Press, 1978), v. 
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Appendix 1 
US Approved Interrogation Tactics110 
 
Approved Tactic Description 
Direct Asking straightforward questions 
Incentive/Removal of Incentive Providing a reward or removing a privilege, beyond those that are 
required by the Geneva Conventions 
Emotional Love Playing on the love that a detainees has for an individual or group 
Emotional Hate Playing on the hatred that a detainee has for an individual or group 
Fear Up Harsh Significantly increasing the fear level in a detainee 
Fear Up Mild Moderately increasing the fear level in a detainee 
Reduced Fear Reducing the fear level in a detainee 
Pride and Ego Up Boosting the ego of a detainee 
Pride and Ego Down Attacking the ego of a detainee 
Futility Invoking a feeling of futility in a detainee 
We Know All Convincing a detainee that the interrogator already know the answers to 
the questions that he is asking 
Establish Your Identity Convincing a detainee that the interrogator has mistaken him for 
someone else 
Repetition Approach Continuously repeating the same question to a detainee during the 
interrogation 
File and Dossier Convincing a detainee that the interrogator has a damning and inaccurate 
file that must be fixed 
Mutt and Jeff Pairing a friendly interrogator with a harsh one 
Rapid Fire Questioning in a rapid succession without allowing the detainees to 
answer 
Silence Staring at the detainee to encourage discomfort 
Change of Scenery Up Removing a detainee from the standard interrogation setting - generally 
to a more pleasant locate, but not a worse one 
Change of Scenery Down Moving a detainee from the standard interrogation setting to a less 
comfortable one 
Dietary Manipulation Changing the diet of a detainee, but with no intended deprivation of food 
or water and without having an adverse cultural or medical effect 
Environmental Manipulation Altering the environment to create moderate discomfort, such as 
adjusting the temperature or introducing an unpleasant smell 
Sleep Adjustment Adjusting the sleeping times of a detainee 
False Flag Convincing detainees that individuals from a country other than the US 
are interrogating them 
Isolation Isolating a detainee from other detainees for up to 30 days 
                                                
110 110 This list was extracted from a number of recently declassified interoffice memos that were circulated 
from August 1, 2002, to April 16, 2003.  They can all  be found in Mark Danners book, Torture and Truth: 
America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror, and include: Memo: Jay Bybee to Alberto Gonzales (August 
1, 2002); Memo: Lieutenant Commander (LTC) Jerald Phifer to Major General (MG) Michael Dunlavey 
(October 11, 2002); Memo: LTC Diane Beaver, Staff Judge Advocate, to MG Michael Dunlavey (October 
11, 2002); Memo: MG Michael Dunlavey to General James Hill (October 11, 2002); Memo: General James 
Hill to General Richard Myers (October 25, 2002); Memo: William Haynes II, General Council, to Donald 
Rumsfeld (December 2, 2002); Memo: Donald Rumsfeld to General James Hill (January 15, 2003); Memo: 
Donald Rumsfeld to William Haynes II (January 15, 2003), and; Memo: Donald Rumsfeld to General 
James Hill (April 16, 2003). 
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